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With the advent of search engines a new problem called Web spam appeared as early as 1996
[35]. More and more webmasters learned the value of the presence in the top search engine
results and started to design the content and link structure of their pages in order to appear
higher for certain queries. This activity is called Search Engine Optimization (SEO) and many
companies were founded to provide SEO services to web page authors. Some activities called
white hat SEO benefit the web community as they inspire creation of well-structured and high
quality pages [64]. Unfortunately many activities fall into the category of black hat SEO similar
activities covered by the terminology of Web spam. Web spam leads to an unfavorable deterio-
ration of search engine quality: completely irrelevant pages may appear for certain query terms
and the sophisticated ranking methods of search engines are no longer capable of selecting the
most relevant, highest quality content.
Identifying and preventing spam was cited as one of the top challenges in web search engines
in a 2002 paper [69]. Amit Singhal, principal scientist of Google Inc. estimated that the search
engine spam industry had a revenue potential of $4.5 billion in year 2004 if they had been able
to completely fool all search engines on all commercially viable queries [116]. Due to the large
and ever increasing financial gains resulting from high search engine ratings, it is no wonder
that a significant amount of human and machine resources are devoted to artificially inflating
the rankings of certain web pages. The birth of the highly successful PageRank algorithm (2.6,
Section 2.6) was indeed partially motivated by the easy spammability of the simple in-degree
count; its variants [11, 13, 60, 65, 74, 128, and many others] proved successful in fighting search
engine spam.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Notion of Web spam
Web spam can be defined in several ways depending on a point of view or the role played in
the Web content industry. In a possible notion [64], a content is called spam if it is completely
irrelevant for the given search terms. However when implementing a search engine one aims
to use ranking methods that select the most relevant highest quality content irrespective to the
amount of search engine optimization for similar, but possibly lower quality content. In another
definition [101] search engine spam consists of features that maintainers would not add to their
sites if search engines didn’t exist. Spam could act even without the presence of a search engine
by misleading users to visit certain pages, in particular for the purpose of misusing affiliate
programs.
We also see frequent examples of non-spam with undeserved search engine ranking. For
example for affiliate pages, spamming is not always the purpose, but it is always a side-effect
as they get paid to redirect traffic to certain sites. Depending on the actual query where a page
receives high rank, one may refer to techniques to attain the high rank as boosting if the page
content is otherwise relevant to the query, see e.g. [64]. We may hence want to de-boost with
the purpose of assisting users to find pages where the maintainer has a lower budget on Search
Engine Optimization.
There is no sound definition of Web spam in the literature. Our techniques should instead
primarily be justified by improved user satisfaction with search engine hit lists. The fact that
there is no clear boundary between honest pages and spam over the Web imposes a bias in the
evaluation that we have to live together with.
Types of Web spam
Web spam is an expensive operation requiring the registration and operation of diverse domain
names and IP ranges. Unlike for email spam where the target is to reach the user mailbox,
Web spammers also compete against each other in obtaining high search engine rankings for
their target pages. Web spamming is hence a professional business with the purpose of financial
gains.
The Web spammer toolkit consists of a clearly identifiable set of manipulation techniques
that has not changed much recently. The Web Spam Taxonomy of Gyöngyi et al. [64] describes
and categorizes many content and link spamming techniques along with techniques of hiding,
cloaking and removing traces by e.g. obfuscated redirection. The taxonomy remains valid since
its publication in 2006. New areas that opened since then include bookmark, comment and post
spam that became widespread with the explosion of the social media.
Although web spam appears in increasingly sophisticated forms, basic spamming tech-
niques fall into two categories, content spam and link spam. Content spam is manipulating
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the textual content of the page, link spam is the creation of artificial link structure that misleads
the link-based ranking algorithms of search engines.
Common examples of content spam are:
• Copied content, “honey pots” that draw attention but link to unrelated, spam targets;
• Garbage content, stuffed with popular or monetizable query terms and phrases such as
university degrees, online casinos, bad credit status or adult content;
Link spam mostly includes link farms, a large number of strongly interlinked pages across
several domains. In order to understand the nature of link spam, we first consider the character-
ization of an “honest” link by [34]:
“hyperlink structure contains an enormous amount of latent human annotation that
can be extremely valuable for automatically inferring notions of authority.”
In this sense the existence of a hyperlink should affect ranking only if it expresses human
annotation. As examples for different uses of hyperlinks we refer to [44] that shows how to
determine intra-site links that may serve both navigational and certain spam purposes. In [64]
more examples are given, among others spamming guest books with links or mirroring with the
sole purpose of the additional links to spam targets. Link spam, in contrast to content spam,
appears to be much harder to catch. By manual inspection of innocent looking pages that we
ranked high for spam, we found sites for mobile logos and tones while a large number of its
backlinks are in fact spam messages in guestbooks. Certain forms of link spam are however
visible to Web users as well.
Certain spammer methods aim to confuse users. These include term hiding (background
color text); cloaking (different content for browsers and search engine robots) and redirection.
Some of these techniques can be traced by inspecting the HTML code within the page source.
Detecting redirection may even require certain expertise: quite a number of doorway spam
pages use obfuscated JavaScript code to redirect to their target.
1.2 Our Results
Spam and various means of search engine optimization seriously deteriorate search engine rank-
ing results; as a response, building black and white lists belongs to the daily routine of search
engine operation. Our goal is to extend this invaluable source of human annotation either to
automatically demote pages similar to certain known spam pages or to suggest additional pages
for the operator to be included in the blacklist.
In this thesis we give five methods for spam detection. SpamRank and Link Based Similarity
work on the neighboring link structure of the pages, Commercial Intent and Language Model
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Disagreement use mainly the textual content, while Combination by graph Stacking utilizes
both kinds of information.
SpamRank is a fully automated method to identify spam pages with no human interaction
required. All the other methods build models over a training set, an initial, manually labeled set
of spam and honest pages.
We evaluated our methods on several data sets. These data sets are large Web page collec-
tions crawled at different times and in different countries. Since the World Wide Web changes
over time and it is affected by language and local cultural differences, the spamming techniques
may differ across our data sets. In our experiments, the best spam filtering methods were indeed
varying depending on the target Web domain.
1.2.1 SpamRank: a method based on supporter irregularity estimation
Spammers intend to increase the PageRank of certain spam pages by creating a large number
of links pointing to them. We proposed a novel method based on the concept of personal-
ized PageRank that detects pages with an undeserved high PageRank value without the need
of white or blacklists or other means of human intervention of any kind. We assumed that
spammed pages have a biased distribution of pages that contribute to the undeserved high Page-
Rank value. We define SpamRank in three steps. First we select the supporters of each page in
their a PageRank-like weighted multi-step neighborhood. Then we identify pages that originate
suspicious support by statistical analysis. Finally we penalize by personalizing PageRank on
suspicious pages. Our method is tested on a 31-million page crawl of the .de domain with
a manually classified 1000-page stratified random sample with bias towards large PageRank
values.
1.2.2 Link-based similarity
We investigated the usability of similarity search in fighting Web spam based on the assump-
tion that an unknown spam page is more similar to certain known spam pages than to honest
pages. In order to be successful, search engine spam never appears in isolation: we observe link
farms and alliances for the sole purpose of search engine ranking manipulation. The artificial
nature and strong inside connectedness however gave rise to successful algorithms to identify
search engine spam. One example is trust and distrust propagation, an idea originating in rec-
ommender systems and P2P networks, that yields spam classificators by spreading information
along hyperlinks from white and blacklists. While most previous results use PageRank variants
for propagation, we form classifiers by investigating similarity top lists of an unknown page
along various measures such as co-citation, companion, nearest neighbors in low dimensional
projections and SimRank. We tested our method over two data sets previously used to measure
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spam filtering algorithms.
1.2.3 Graph Stacking
We compared a wide range of semi-supervised learning techniques for Web spam filtering.
Semi-supervised learning has the assumption that the label of a node in a graph is similar to
those of its neighbors. Our experiments demonstrated that stacked graphical learning in com-
bination with graph node similarity methods improve classification accuracy. The result show
a very good performance of co-citation and little actual use of the neighborhood beyond two
steps in the graph.
Besides spam filtering, we evaluated these methods on a different problem. We applied the
methods on a telephone call graph where the task is to predict telephone churn i.e. users who are
going to cancel their telephone line. This problem is quite similar to spam detection, since we
can use the telephone graph instead of the web graph and demographic and traffic data instead
of web content. Our assumption was that the label (spam and churned, respectively) of a node
in a graph is similar to those of its neighbors. The same method may work because churn occurs
similarly in bursts in groups of a social network.
1.2.4 Language Model Disagreement
We demonstrated the applicability of hyperlink downweighting by means of language model
disagreement. The method filters out hyperlinks with no relevance to the target page without
the need of white and blacklists or human interaction. Our method is capable of fighting against
various forms of nepotism such as common maintainers, ads, link exchanges or misused affiliate
programs. We tested our method on the same dataset as SpamRank.
1.2.5 Commercial Intent
We proposed a number of features for Web spam filtering based on the occurrence of keywords
that are either of high advertisement value or highly spammed. Our features include popu-
lar words from search engine query logs as well as high cost or volume words according to
Google AdWords. We also demonstrated the spam filtering power of the Online Commercial
Intention (OCI) value assigned to an URL in a Microsoft adCenter Labs Demonstration and
the Yahoo! Mindset classification of Web pages as either commercial or non-commercial as
well as metrics based on the occurrence of Google ads on the page. We run our tests on the
WEBSPAM-UK2006 dataset as a standard means of measuring the performance of Web spam
detection algorithms. Our features improve the classification accuracy of the publicly available
WEBSPAM-UK2006 features by 3%.
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1.3 Organization
We begin with a preliminary chapter with a short introduction on search engines, link analysis
and other fundamental methods used in this thesis. Then we give an overview of known spam-
ming and spam fighting techniques. In the last five chapters, we give the detailed description




In this section we give a general introduction to Web search, the main application area of the
results presented in this thesis. First, in Section 2.1 we review the basic characteristics of the
Web and the Web graph. Then we outline the architecture of state of the art search engines,
followed by a review of the ranking and machine learning methods that are often referred in this
thesis. Finally we overview the quality metrics applied to evaluate our methods.
2.1 The World Wide Web
The World Wide Web can be viewed as a database managed by the humanity to store and share
various documents around the World. However, the Web significantly differs from traditional
databases in its extreme size, very fast dynamics and inhomogeneity.
First of all, the Web is extremely large. However, it is not clear what the exact size of the
Web means and how it could be measured. Due to automatically generated pages, the number
of different pages is practically infinite. Pages can be generated randomly or the content may
also depend on the information entered by the user. Gulli and Signorini [61] reported that the
Web contained at least 11.5 billion pages in January, 2005. In 2008 Google claimed that their
system processed at once 1 trillion unique URLs on the Web [118].
Another challenge is that the content of the Web changes rapidly, so keeping a local reposi-
tory up-to-date to date can never be completely achieved. Cho and Garcia-Molina [37] numer-
ically evaluated the speed of the change by downloading 720,000 pages daily in a four-month
period of 1999. They experienced that the page content was modified within one day for as
much as 23% of the collection and 50% of the pages had been modified or removed within 50
days [7].
The documents on the Web are inhomogeneous for several reasons and in many aspects.
Besides text, the Web contains images, videos and audio files in several file formats. The size
of the documents can vary from a few bytes to hundreds of megabytes. Even among the most
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common HTML files we can find different versions, non-standard solutions and syntactically
incorrect pages that does not observe the W3C standards but can still be visualized by Web
browsers. Web documents do not conform to prescribed schemes that makes automatic in-
formation distillation very difficult. The content is often unstructured, composed in different
languages and styles and its quality varies on a wide range. Although HTML pages often con-
tain some meta-data, this information is not reliable in general. While it is the declared goal
of the Semantic Web initiative to put data in more structured, “machine friendly” formats with
well defined meaning on the Web to enable cooperation among humans and computers alike
[18], it is yet to be seen whether this approach is going to be adopted on a wider base.
2.2 The Web as a graph
The Web appears chaotic in comparison to conventional text collections. However, hyperlinks
across the document make the Web a richer and useful data source as well. Apart from serving
as a means of navigation, hyperlinks define a huge network that connect the documents on
the Web. As another advantage, in contrast to the inhomogeneous and unreliable metadata
provided along with HTML text, hyperlinks define a simple, language-independent, unified
binary relation within the collection of Web documents.
The link structure of the Web can be represented as a directed graph G = (V, E) where V
is the set of Web pages and E is set of links (u, v) ∈ E iff a page u links to the page v. Within
this graph let d− (u) denote the in-degree of u, i.e. the number of pages that link to u and d+ (u)
the out-degree, i.e. the number of pages that are pointed by u.
The Web graph as other human-generated networks has several interesting properties that
we describe next. First we define two variants of the Web graph based on granularity. Then in
Section 2.2.2 we describe the connectivity and in Section 2.2.3 the degree distribution properties
of these graphs.
2.2.1 Web graph at the page and host level
Links between pages do not always have the same meaning. Unlike links between different
Web sites that carry human annotation and recommendation, navigational links between internal
pages of the Web site may not suggest additional value for the page pointed. Davison in [44]
shows how to determine intra-site links that may serve only navigational purposes. These links
may be removed from the Web graph if necessary.
A simpler solution to distinguish recommendational links from navigational ones is to ig-
nore every intra-site links and build a smaller graph where the nodes are sites and edges are
links between sites only. In this case we do not distinguish pages of the same site and hence if
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our ranking algorithm assigns scores to the nodes of the graph, all pages on the same site will
get the same score.
Unfortunately it is nontrivial to determine the set of pages that belong to one site. While in
most cases URLs of the same site agree in the hostname part, on one hand sites may also use
multiple hostnames while on the other hand different users can create their own homepages on
the same host. In this latter case these homepages should be treated as different sites while they
agree in the host name.
In this thesis the site-level Web graph refers to Web graph whose nodes are sites determined
by hostnames only. In agreement with the recently organized Web Spam Challenges [32, 33],
in the rest of the discussion we make no attempt to refine the classification of pages into sites.
2.2.2 Connectivity
22 % 27 %
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Figure 2.1: The bow-tie structure of the Web as depicted in [25]
If the Web hyperlinks are treated as undirected edges,apart from a few isolated pages, the
Web graph forms a single connected component. If however edges are treated directed, the Web
graph shows a different structure. A large number of nodes are not reachable from the rest of
the graph and another big portion cannot reach the rest. Based on these properties the nodes of
the graph can be partitioned into five parts. This structure was discovered by Broder et al. [25]
analyzing their repository of 203M Web pages and it is often referenced as the bow-tie structure
of the Web.
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Broder et al. [25] define the following partition of the Web pages shown in Fig. 2.1. The
biggest part is the central core (SCC), the largest strongly connected component of the graph.
In the SCC every node is accessible in a few steps from any other node in SCC. The size of the
SCC was 56M pages (27%) in Broder’s experiment while the second largest strongly connected
component contained only 150K pages. Nodes outside the SCC that are accessible from the
SCC and that can reach SCC form another two large components OUT and IN, both of them
representing 22% of whole graph. The remaining nodes are either accessible from IN or can
reach OUT (TENDRILS) or not connected to any of the above parts (DISC).
2.2.3 Degree distribution
In order to describe global properties of the Web graph such as the degree distribution or the
appearance of communities, several models of the evolution of the Web were introduced [8,
79, and many more]. These models describe the overall hyperlink structure as one arising by
adding links to pages depending on their existing popularity, an assumption that agrees with
common sense. For example in the most powerful model [79], pages within similar topics
copy their links that result in a “rich gets richer” phenomenon and yields a so-called power law
degree distribution. In the power law distribution, the probability that a node has degree i is
proportional to 1/iα for some α > 1.
Broder at al. [25] claims the the in-degree follows Zipfian law more than the power law.
In the Zipfian law for in-degree, the probability that a node has a degree of i is proportional
to 1/kα for α > 1 where k is the rank of i. The distributions differ both for large exceptional
values of i Since the two distributions are very similar, in this thesis we prefer to assume that
the degree distribution is power law.
Not only the degree distribution follows power or Zipf law, many other properties of the
Web (PageRank, word frequencies) follows similar distribution.
2.3 Search Engines
In the early days of the Web, users relied on two primary mechanisms for navigating. Either they
typed the URL of the target page into the address bar of the browser or they clicked hyperlinks
on the pages. As the number of pages on the Web increased, two additional methods appeared:
Web dictionaries and Web search engines.
Web directories contain a large number of hyperlinks pointing to useful pages. The links are
usually organized in a hierarchical topical taxonomy and usually collected by paid or volunteer
human editors. Well known examples are the Yahoo! Directory at dir.yahoo.com and the
Open Directory Project dmoz.org. Unfortunately creating and maintaining Web directories of
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Figure 2.3: In-degree distribution of the Stanford WebBase Web graph [119]
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sufficient coverage requires a huge amount of human effort. Since the Web is changing rapidly
[7], it is very hard to keep Web directories up-to-date. Additionally, it takes a non-negligible
effort on the users’ side to drill-down and choose the most appropriate category in the multi-
level topic hierarchy.
Web search engines on the other hand are almost fully automated, they need much less
human effort to keep the database up-to-date and can cope with the fast growing nature of
the Web. They provide a service that suggests pages based on the keywords entered by the
user. Usually the user types keywords or short text into the box on the search page, clicks on
the ‘Search’ button and the search engine produces a handful of links to result pages which
hopefully match the user’s interest.
Search engines rank the result pages according to their relevance and present best candidates
in a decreasing order of relevance. Search engines are capable of returning more focused results
than Web Directories. However, for badly formed and ambiguous queries the results are often
useless or misleading. The main challenge of Web search is to understand the query and return
the most appropriate results. The Web usually contains thousands or millions of pages that
matches the user’s keywords but users want to see only a few relevant results, they do not want
to look at even a hundred pages to find pages that satisfies their needs. Search engine query
log analysis [115] showed that users almost always look at the first 10 results listed on the first
result page.
Relevance ranking constitutes the main focus of Information Retrieval (IR), a multidisci-
plinary research field of selecting and ranking documents that match the given keywords. How-
ever, as mentioned earlier in Section 2.1, the Web is different compared to classical text col-
lections. Pages are linked to each other by hyperlinks that can be exploited in computing the
relevance. The initial success of Google can be traced back to being the first search engine
using these off-page factors.
Usage data of search engines can be additional factors in search engines. Click through data
of the search engine’s results represents implicit feedback about the relevance and quality of
Web pages and it can measure the correctness of the ranking mechanism [106]. Ranking can
also be tuned to individual user needs by analyzing past search behavior.
2.4 The architecture of Web search engines
Although information on the components and algorithms of commercial search engines is in
general not publicly available, the overall structure is believed to be similar to the one depicted
on Figure 2.4 and described in [2, 24, 107].
The architecture can be separated into three logical components.
1. The Crawler downloads the Web pages to a local repository.
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Figure 2.4: General search engine architecture, reproduced from [2]
2. The Indexer processes downloaded pages builds and several databases and indices.
3. The Query engine serves user queries using the preprocessed data produced by indexing.
2.4.1 Crawling
The crawler traverses the Web graph by following hyperlinks and downloads the pages discov-
ered in this process. The traverse starts from a seed set and follows hyperlinks in a breadth first
search like order. The downloaded pages are stored in a local repository.
The main challenges in crawling are:
Coverage. Download as many pages as possible while not overloading Web sites. Crawlers
have to obey rules that does not allow too frequent requests.
Freshness. Outdated pages should be eventually re-fetched. Different kinds of pages may have
different “lifetime”. Frequently changing pages should be re-fetched more often but pages
that almost never change may only be rarely updated. The task of the crawler is to simul-
taneously maximize the freshness and the coverage.
For further details of crawling and freshness see Castillo [31] and [38, 39, 86].
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2.4.2 Indexing
In order to answer a query within fractions of a second, massive precomputation is needed.
During the precomputation several databases, indices are built. For each word w, the main
index contains the posting list of all document identifiers and positions (and maybe other short
information) where w occurs. The posting lists are processed for all query words in order
to produce the list of documents that matches the query. The eventual hit list is obtained by
computing the intersection of posting lists of each query words. This index is often referred as
the inverted index because it represents the transposed view of the document-word relation.
Building the index is usually done in a massively parallelized manner. It involves parsing
and tokenizing the documents in the repository as well as the building of posting lists. Efficient
algorithms for building and compressing the text index are discussed in [5, 58, 112, 124].
Besides the main index, several other databases and indices are built that are mostly used by
ranking and crawling. For example the Web graph is constructed by parsing the hyperlinks on
the pages. Query independent quality metrics (e.g. PageRank) can be computed and stored for
each document in additional utility indices.
2.4.3 Query Server Engine
The main purpose of the query engine is to process queries submitted by users. If the query
contains more than one query words, search engines usually assume an AND relationship be-
tween them, i.e. the user will receive in pages that contain all words of the query. In order to
produce this list of documents, the query engine looks up the posting lists of query words in
the index, computes the intersection of them, applies ranking and presents hits to the user in
decreasing order of relevance. The presentation of the results may involve other computation
and database accesses such as generating snippets, short excerpts of the documents containing
the query words. All these processes should be done in a fraction of a second. This response
time requires efficient algorithms and justifies the massive precomputation during indexing.
Since there are thousands or millions of pages on the Web containing the query words,
ranking is crucial in Web information retrieval. Showing thousands of results and letting the
user find the best one would quickly distract the users. Search engines usually presents only ten
results to the user and the user almost never asks for more.
Ranking is based on several factors [28, 48, 51]. Some of them does not depend on the query.
These off-line factors including PageRank (Section 2.6) can be computed during indexing. On-
line components, e.g. information retrieval scores [5] should be computed on the fly when
serving the query.
Ranking must be performed in fractions of a second as well, so it requires efficient algo-
rithms and heuristics [9, 24, 88, 95] including caching [89] or focusing to the top ranked results
2.5. CONTENT-BASED RANKING 15
based on off-line ranking factors.
2.5 Content-based ranking
Content-based ranking is the component of search engines that resembles most to the main
focus of the classical Information Retrieval, the multidisciplinary field of investigating models
for selecting and ranking documents that match the given keywords. Search engines assign
relevance scores to each document that express relevance of the document to the query. Both
the documents and the queries are treated as a sequence of words. The query fed to the ranking
algorithm sometimes differs from the original query typed by the user. Some words may be
omitted, and other words may be added to the query. For example very frequent words (the, a,
and etc.) are often removed from the query, since they are not discriminative enough and may
cause noise in ranking. On the other hand, related words such as synonyms or inflections may
be added to the query in order to find documents that contain other forms of the query word.
There are two models often used in Information Retrieval and in search engines: The vector
space model [5] represents the documents and queries with vectors; The probabilistic relevance
model [109] adopts a probabilistic approach. In this thesis, we apply the simpler vector space
model in our experiments.
2.5.1 Vector Space Model, TF-IDF
In the vector space model, each document is represented by a sparse vector where each entry
correspond to a word. Only the entries corresponding to the words in the document are nonzero.
Similarly, the queries are represented as a sparse vector and the relevance is defined by the
similarity between the query and the document vectors. There are several ways to define the
value of a word in a document vector to express the importance of the corresponding word.
Next, we describe the best known scheme called TF-IDF weighting.
First let us assume that the query contains a single term t. How can we measure the relevance
of of a document d for this query? The first obvious idea is to use the number of occurrences of
t. This approach is however satisfactory only if all documents have similar size. If a short and
a long document both contain t in the same number of times, then one can feel that the shorter
is more likely relevant than the longer because the longer one may contain additional unrelated
content.
By the above reasoning we define term frequency as the number of occurrences normalized
with the total number of words in the document. Let Ni,j be the number of times term t appears
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Now let us turn to multi-term queries. Assume that our query is “The Big Apple” and we
use the sum of the three term frequencies as relevance score. It is obvious that the three terms
in the query are not equally important. A document that contains words “The” and “Big” many
times but “Apple” only once may be less relevant than the document containing “Apple” many
times but with possibly less “The” and “Big”. Terms that appear in many documents represent
less information about the topic of documents they appear in. Rare terms are much more useful
to express a specific subject.
Let us define Document frequency of term t as the fraction of the documents that contain t
at least once. Inverse document frequency, the logarithm of the inverse of document frequency
is used as a weight for terms:
IDFt = log
|D|
|{d ∈ D : t ∈ d}|
. (2.2)
Finally the TF-IDF score of document d for query q is the combination of the term frequency




TFt,d · IDFt. (2.3)
Different parts of the documents may have different importance, so for a query term occur-
rence one may also take the location (title, URL, file name, keywords section) or the type (font
size, boldface) into account. It may be reasonable to assign higher scores for query terms that
appear in the title than another term in the body. Higher weight can applied for words written
in larger font size or words appearing at the beginning of the document.
2.5.2 Anchor text
Web pages have a special feature of key importance in Web information retrieval: Hyperlinks
on the Web pages are usually associated with a few word anchor text. This short text usually
contains characteristic information about the pointed (and not the containing) page. Web search
engines index the text of hyperlinks as the content of the target page in addition to the page
containing the link. Even more, the weight at the target page is in general much higher.
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2.6 PageRank
PageRank was invented by Brin and Page [98] and it is probably the best known link-based
ranking algorithm. In this section we will define PageRank. The discussion starts with the
description of simpler ranking algorithms in order to highlight the considerations that lead to
the invention of PageRank.
Link-based ranking algorithms compute scores to the pages based on the intuition that the
existence of an edge (u; v) implies that the author of page u votes for the quality of v. A
straightforward implementation of the above intuition is to rank the pages by their in-degree
d−(v), the number of pages linking to v. This simple method has several drawbacks:
• All links are treated equally, thus one can easily create lots of dummy pages that link to a
target page to increase its in-degree. In other words, in-degree is easily spammable.
• A link from a popular page such as cnn.com should carry more value than even several
links from low quality pages, i.e. the contribution of good pages should be higher.
• Pages with high out-degree have higher impact on the rank of other pages. Thus, the
contribution of link from page u should be proportional to 1/d+(u).





i.e. a page is of high quality if it is pointed to by high quality pages.
Observe that a zero out-degree node w (often called “dangling” node) acts as “sink”: any
rank assigned to w is lost, since w never appears on the right hand side of Equation (2.4). By
summing Equation (2.4) for all u we observe that we must have p(u) = 0 for all dangling nodes.
Consequently all nodes that can reach a zero out-degree node via a directed path in G must have
rank 0, a clearly undesirable consequence. Therefore let us modify Equation (2.4) such that all
dangling nodes have links to all existing nodes. This means that all nodes will receive 1/n rank
from each dangling node, where n is the number of nodes. Let B denote the adjacency matrix





1/d+ (u) if page u points to v
1/n if d+ (u) = 0
0 otherwise,
(2.5)
Now our equation can rewritten in matrix form:
p = BT p. (2.6)
18 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
In order to make Equation (2.6) meaningful, we have to ensure that there exists a unique
solution. Notice that B describes the state transition matrix of a homogeneous Markov chain
corresponding to the uniform independent random walk on the Web graph and p is the limit
distribution of the Markov chain. It is a well-known fact from the theory of Markov chains that
there exist a unique stationary distribution and thus a unique solution for the above system of
equations if the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic [93]. Moreover, the unique solution
p is a probability distribution.
The transition matrix B and the corresponding Markov chain is aperiodic if and only if the
greatest common divisor of the length of all directed cycles in the Web graph G is one. This
requirement is always satisfied in practice. B is irreducible if and only if G consists of a single
strongly connected component (SCC), i.e. there is a directed path between any pair of pages
in G. As mentioned in Section 2.2, this requirement is not satisfied in practice. It could be
achieved by restricting the computation to the largest strongly connected component of the Web
graph but the largest SCC of the real Web graph contains 25-30% of the nodes only [25].
In order to overcome these difficulties, we add a small weight complete graph to the Web
graph. We define the PageRank vector p with p(i) ≥ 0 and ‖p‖1 = 1 as the solution of the
following set of modified equations




where r = (r(1), . . . , r(n))T is the so-called teleportation or personalization vector with r(i) ≥
0, ‖r‖1 = 1 and c is the teleportation probability with a typical value of c ≈ 0.15. If r is
uniform, i.e. r(v) = 1/n for all v, then p is the PageRank (PR).
In matrix notation, let
M(u,v) = cr(v) + (1− c)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1/d+ (u) if page u points to v and d+ (u) > 0
1/n if d+ (u) = 0
0 otherwise.
Then equation (2.7) gives us
p = cr + (1− c)BT p = MT p. (2.8)
This matrix is aperiodic, since nodes with r(v) > 0 have length one cycles with positive
transition probability M(vv) > 0. If r(v) > 0 for all v in G, then all nodes are reachable from
all nodes so all nodes forms one single SCC, hence M is irreducible.
The idea of PageRank can explained through the random surfer model as well. The random
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surfer models a user who navigates through Web pages. He can perform two kinds of actions.
Either he follows one of the hyperlinks of the current page or directly goes to a random page.
He chooses the first and second action with probability 1 − c and c. If he decided to follow
one of the links, the link is chosen uniformly at random. In the other case the target page v is
selected with probability r(v). This second kind of action is called teleportation where c is the
teleportation probability and r is the teleportation or personalization vector.
If p(k) denotes the distribution of the random surfer at time k with p(0) = r, then





By the fundamental theorem of Markov chains [93], the kth iterate p(k) always converges to
the unique solution p of (2.7) and the fraction of the time that the random surfer spends on page
v converges to the PageRank p(v) of v.
2.7 Personalized PageRank
If teleportation probability vector r is uniform, we refer to it as uniform, otherwise personalized
PageRank. Unless otherwise stated, PageRank stands for uniform PageRank. To avoid mis-
understanding, we will denote uniform PageRank by p and personalized PageRank by PPR(r)
where r is the personalization vector. Uniform PageRank shows a general measure of goodness
for each page. Personalized PageRank can introduce a bias towards a specific type of pages:
e.g. r can be chosen such that r(v) is positive for well known sports pages and 0 otherwise.
This means that our random surfer will go to a random sports page if he gets bored with follow-
ing the links. Pages that are reachable in a few steps from sports pages will get higher score.
Other pages that are not reachable in a few steps are unlikely related to sports and will get lower
PageRank.
An important property of personalized PageRank is its linearity [72]. For any α1, α2 positive
constants such that α1 + α2 = 1,
PPR(α1r1 + α2r2) = α1PPR(r1) + α2PPR(r2).
In an important special case r consists of all 0 except for a single node v. Any personalized





rj · PPRi(χj), (2.10)
where χj is the personalization vector consisting of all 0 except for node j where χj(j) = 1.
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By equation (2.11) we may say that the PageRank of page i arises as the contribution of
personalization over certain pages v where PPRi(χv) is high. We say that page v supports i to
the above extent.
As noticed independently by [55, 72], the (personalized) PageRank of a vertex is equal to
the probability of a random walk terminating at the given vertex where the length is from a
geometric distribution: we terminate in step t with probability c · (1− c)t. To justify, notice that
PageRank can be rewritten as a power series
PPR(r) = c ·
∞∑
t=0
(1− c)tr · At. (2.12)
By personalized PageRank, ranking can be tuned towards specific user interest. However,
it is not easy to implement it in practice. While the personalization vector can differ for each
query, it would be very expensive to compute PageRank at query time.
If we could compute the PPR(χj) vectors for all nodes j, based on Equation (2.10), person-
alized PageRank could simply be computed as a weighted sum of these precomputed vectors.
Unfortunately the total size of these N vectors of dimension N is gigantic, which rules out this
approach as well.
Fogaras et al. [57] suggest a Monte-Carlo approximation of PPR(χj) vectors based on
Equation (2.12). If we generate a sufficient number of random walks starting at vertex j, then
by adding up probabilities ε(1 − ε)t for their endpoints i, we get Supporti,j as an unbiased
estimator of PPRi(χj). Experiments in [57] suggest that a thousand simulations suffice in order
to separate high and low rank pages.
2.8 HITS
Kleinberg [34] introduced an iterative ranking algorithm referred as Kleinberg’s algorithm or
HITS. HITS ranking is query-dependent, which implies that the computation must be fast as it
is performed at query time. HITS computation is based on a topically focused small subgraph
which is generated in the following way:
• Acquire a seed set of search results Sq assumed to be relevant to the given query q. This
could be the top n results of an existing search engine using text based ranking.
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• Extend this seed set with other results that are likely to be relevant to the topic. Usually
pages that are linked from Sq and pages that point to Sq are added. For high in-degree
nodes sampling can be applied to avoid adding too many pages.
• Build the vicinity graph Gq, the subgraph spanned by the extended seed set S ′q.
HITS computes two scores for each node in Gn. The authority score a(v) reflects the rele-
vance of the content of v to the query. The hub score h(v) measures the quality of v as a link
collection considering the given topic. The algorithm is based on the intuition that good hubs
likely link to good authorities and good authorities appear in good hub pages. Thus, good hubs
and authorities mutually reinforce each other.
In an iterative algorithm, let h(k) and a(k) denote the vectors of hub and authority scores.
The first hub vector h(0) may contain arbitrary positive values.
The (k + 1)-th authority score of v is computed from the previous hub vector h(k) as the











If Aq is the adjacency graph of Gq then the above equations can expressed in matrix form:











It is shown in [34] that h(k) and a(k) converge to a unique h and a, the principal eigenvectors
of the AT A and AAT , respectively. In practice, no more than a few hundred iterations suffice
for convergence.
Unfortunately HITS computation should be performed at query time, a disadvantage com-
pared to PageRank. The computation includes fast subgraph construction requiring random
access to the Web graph.
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2.9 Link-based similarity
The link-based similarity of nodes u and v in the Web graph is based on the neighboring link
structure, usually the incoming links of u and v. One may assume that if two pages are pointed
by similar other pages, then these two pages may topically related.
2.9.1 Co-citation, Jaccard and cosine
The simplest and often the most effective link based similarity measure is co-citation, coc(u, v)
defined as the number of common in-neighbors of u and v. Co-citation may have directed
and undirected variants. Co-citation is very easy to compute, but, similar to in-degree, it is
vulnerable to spam. Co-citation of two pages, even a page of high reputation and another spam
page, can be easily increased by creating pages that link to these pages.
The Jaccard coefficient is useful for finding important connections and ignoring “accidental”
unimportant connections. The Jaccard coefficient Jac(u, v) is the ratio of common neighbors
within all neighbors. The Jaccard coefficient has variants that use the reversed or undirected
graphs. For a weighted graph we may divide the total weight to common neighbors by the total
weight of edges from u and v. This measure performs poor if for example edges ux and vy
have low weight while uy and vx have very high weights since the Jaccard coefficient is high
while the actual similarity is very low.
Cosine similarity fixes the above problem of the Jaccard coefficient. Let us denote the row
of the adjacency matrix corresponding to node u as vector u. The cosine similarity of nodes u
and v is simply cos(u, v) = uT v. It has also transposed and undirected variants. For unweighted
graphs, cosine is equivalent to co-citation.
2.9.2 SimRank
SimRank was suggested by Jeh and Widom [71] as a measure of link-based similarity of two
nodes in the graph. The basic idea is that two nodes are similar if they are pointed by similar
nodes. SimRank is the generalization of co-citation in the same way as PageRank is generaliza-
tion of in-degree











if u1 = u2,
1 if u1 = u2.
(2.16)
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where the summation is for all pairs (v1, u1) ∈ E, (v2, u2) ∈ E. SimRank is the multi-step
generalization of co-citation in the same way as PageRank generalizes in-degree.
SimRank power iterations as in (2.16) are infeasible since they require quadratic space. We
may use our algorithm from [111] instead, i.e. with additive error ε = 0.001 and 10 iterations.
We use all non-zeroes as the top list with size k. Since in internal steps the algorithm rounds
down to multiples of the error parameter, the choice of ε determines the value of k.
Fogaras and Rácz [56] describe two variants PSimRank and XJaccard by modifying similar-
ity propagation in the above equation (2.16); they give randomized approximation algorithms
and measure PSimRank as better predictor of topical similarity than SimRank. We [111] ap-
plied rounding and randomized sketching for SimRank and personalized PageRank problems
which gave provable guarantees of approximation and built space optimal data structures to
answer arbitrary on-line user queries.
2.10 The Singular Value Decomposition
Singular Value Decomposition is a factorization of a matrix with several applications in linear
algebra, statistics, signal processing and Information Retrieval.
The Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of a rank ρ matrix A ∈ Rm×n is given by A =
UΣV T with U ∈ Rm×ρ, V ∈ Rn×ρ are orthogonal matrices and Σ ∈ Rρ×ρ is a positive diagonal
matrix containing the values σ1 ≥ ... ≥ σρ > 0. These σ1, ..., σρ are referred to as the singular
values and the columns of U and V are referred to as the left and right singular vectors.
SVD is related to the HITS (Section 2.8) algorithm. It can be shown that the columns of U
and V are the eigenvectors of the AAT and AT A, respectively, with σ21, ..., σ2ρ as eigenvalues.
The h hub and a authority vectors of HITS are eigenvectors of AT A and AAT corresponding to
the highest eigenvalue, i.e. h = v1 and a = u1, where u1 and v1 are the first columns of U and
V , respectively.
SVD can be used for low-rank approximation of matrices: By the Eckart-Young theorem,




where Ut ∈ Rm×t and Vt ∈ Rn×t contain the first t columns of U and V and the diagonal
Σt ∈ R







where u1, ..., ut and v1, ..., vt are the first columns of U and V .
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In this thesis we use SVD for nearest neighbor search after a low dimensional projection of
the adjacency matrix of a graph. A node u can be represented by the corresponding row of VtΣt
and similarity is defined as the Euclidean distance in this t dimensional space. Besides compu-
tational advantages, the low dimensional projection also serves noise reduction in a similar way
as Latent Semantic Indexing [100] applies to the word–document matrix.
2.11 Machine Learning
Machine learning is the field of designing and developing algorithms that “learn”. In this case
“learning” means that for a given task (which usually involves inference from data) the algo-
rithm can improve its performance over time by using more data.
More formally, machine learning can be viewed as searching for some model that is a good
approximation of an unknown function characterizing the system in question. We assume that
there is a true function y = f(x) which maps input x to output y. We do not know the real f
but we have observations on the input and sometimes on the output, the training data as well.
Learning is the process of searching for an f ′ that matches the observations as good as possible.
The function f ′ is often referred as themodel and the set of functions F from which it is selected
as the hypothesis space.
Machine learning methods can be categorized into types based on the nature of training data
and the way of usage.
• In supervised learning a set of examples with the “right” answer is given. For each input
x in the training data, we know the correct output y = f(x). The task is to predict the
answer for future input. The model is finalized after processing the training data and not
modified during the prediction for unseen data.
• In unsupervised learning no “right” answer is given. The task is to explain the data in
terms of a few classes or parameters. The algorithm has to discover how the data is
organized and identify the classes. The best known form of unsupervised learning is
clustering, where the data consists of groups (clusters). Data points in the same group
should be similar and in different groups far from each other based on a given measure.
The task of clustering aims at determining the most appropriate cluster for each data point.
• Semi-supervised learning is the hybrid of supervised and unsupervised learning. A large
set of data is given but the “right” answer is known for only a small fraction of them.
The methods usually identifies certain regularity in the unlabeled data and uses the la-
beled data to leverage on that. Results show that using the unlabeled data can improve
the learning accuracy. By using semi-supervised learning, the expensive production of
labeled data can be reduced.
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We shortly overview the machine learning techniques used in this thesis.
2.11.1 Naïve Bayes
The Naïve Bayes classifier [67] is a generative approach based on Bayesian inference. Given
a sample xk = (x1k, ..., xmk ) and a class Hi, the Naïve Bayes method computes the posterior
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Now for each xi we want to determine the class Hi with the highest probability:
P (Hi|xk) > P (Hl|xk) for all i : j, i = j.










where Z is a constant independent of Hi.
Naïve Bayes assumes all the features x1k, ..., xmk are independent, so the conditional distri-









A class label H∗ = Hi is assigned to each sample xk with a decision rule that picks the most
probable hypothesis:




Naïve Bayes is a quite simple and fast method. The model can be built in time linear in the
size of the the training set. It works quite well for classifying text documents using words as
features.
2.11.2 Decision Trees
Decision Trees are classifiers [104] presented in the form of binary trees where each node
corresponds to a variable and edges represent possible realization of that variable. Given a
sample xk = (x1k, ..., xmk ), leaf nodes correspond to a possible class H . The main goal of a
Decision Tree is to build class hypotheses based on the observed attributes of the training data.
The output dichotomic decision tree can be used to determine the class label of an unclassified
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sample by considering its descriptive attribute realizations. Building a decision tree model from
a training dataset involves two phases. In the first phase, a splitting attribute and a split index
are chosen. The second phase involves splitting the records among the child nodes based on the
decision made in the first phase. This process is recursively continued until a stopping criterion
is satisfied. Classification quality depends on the choice of the variable ordering (from the
root to the leaf) and the values for the splitting rule. Two of the most widely used indices for
evaluating whether a node should be split or not are the Gini Index and the Entropy Deviance.









f(j, t) log f(j, t)
where f(j, t) represents the frequency of value t in node j.
Although decision trees are one of the most popular learning techniques, they suffer from
overfitting, the phenomenon of producing high quality prediction on the training data while low
on the unseen test data.
2.11.3 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVM) [40] are linear learning techniques aimed at determining the
optimal hyperplane that discriminates samples of different classes. SVM classifiers are in gen-
eral considered especially effective for text classification.
Given a training set defined over the input space X and with an output class domain Y
defined by
(x1, y1), ..., (xl, yl) ∈ (X × Y ),
Support Vector Machines find the optimal hyperplane O = {x ∈ Rn : wTx + b = 0} with
the maximum margin, i.e. with the maximum distance between class samples. When samples
are not linearly separable, features are transformed in a higher dimensional space by a kernel
function Φ that allow the samples to be separated.
The optimal hyperplane O is defined by learning from data two parameters: the weight
vector w and the bias b . Let S1 and S2 be two disjoint subsets of samples defined into the
feature space F , where samples (xk, yk) ∈ S1 have yk = −1 and samples (xp, yp) ∈ S2 have
yp = +1 . For any sample xt , since the maximum margin depends on w the classification
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||w||2 such that yt(wT xt + b)− 1 ≥ 0
2.12 Classification Quality Measures
In this section we describe the evaluation measures used in this thesis. We use the standard
measures of Information Retrieval, but we focus on detecting spam pages instead of relevant
pages.
2.12.1 Precision and Recall
Assume we have a classifier C and a test set of documents D. Classifier C computes a label
for each document p ∈ D. Let C(p) = 1 if p is classified spam and C(p) = 0 otherwise. Let
S ⊂ D and N ⊂ D denote the set of spam and normal pages (S ∪ N = D). The algorithm
categorizes each document in D as spam or a normal page. Let denote SA and NA the set of
pages that are detected spam and normal by the algorithm. In summary,
S = {p ∈ D|p is spam}
N = {p ∈ D|p is not spam}
SC = {p ∈ D|C(p) = 1}
NC = {p ∈ D|C(p) = 0}
Let us define the following metrics:
• true positives are the spam documents that are correctly detected as spam, TPC = S∩SC .
• true negatives are the normal documents that are correctly detected as normal, TNC =
N ∩NC .
• false positives are the normal documents that are incorrectly detected as spam, FPC =
N ∩ SC .
• false negatives are the spam documents that are incorrectly detected as normal, FNC =
S ∩NC .
The two-by-two matrix of these values forms the confusion matrix:
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predicted positive predicted negative
positive true positives true negatives
negative false positives false negatives














In most cases the classifier output is not binary but a predicted “spamminess” value or a
probability of being spam. In this case we can apply a threshold on this value and label a page




⎩1 if C(p) > Θ,0 otherwise.
For different Θ the performance of the algorithm will be different.
Assume that 0 < C(p) ≤ 1 for all p ∈ D and there is only one q ∈ D with C(q) = 1. In the
extreme case of Θ = 0, C0 will label every document spam, so its precision is PC0 = |S|/|D|
and its recall is RC0 = 1.
In the other extreme case, C1 will detect the document q as spam and label all others normal.
So its precision is PC1 = 1 and recall is RC1 = 1/|S|.
The reasonable value of Θ is somewhere between these two cases. However, it is not clear
which Θ is the best. We can select the one where the corresponding F-measure is the highest,
but we may prefer higher precision to higher recall or vice versa.
The precision and recall values are often visualized by the precision-recall graph. Assume
that we have a set of documents with 20% spam. Let there be three algorithms with different
parameter 0 ≤ Θ ≤ 1. Table 2.12.1 shows the percentage of true and false positives of these
three algorithms:
• R refers to an algorithm which computes a uniform random number for every p indepen-
dently of p. The expected precision is 0.2 for all Θ where the recall is not 0.
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Θ TPRΘ FPRΘ TPAlg1Θ TPAlg1Θ TPAlg2Θ TPAlg2Θ
0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0.1 2 8 3 0 2 0.5
0.2 4 16 5 1 5 2
0.3 6 24 7 2 7 3
0.4 8 32 8 3 8 4
0.5 10 40 10 5 11 6
0.6 12 48 12 7 13 7
0.7 14 56 15 15 16 9
0.8 16 64 18 30 18 12
0.9 18 72 19 50 19 30
1.0 20 80 20 80 20 80
Table 2.1: Example: Number of true positive and false positive items of three algorithms.
• Alg 1 and Alg 2 perform better than the random algorithm, but it is not clear which one
is better. Alg 1 has higher precision at lower recall but Alg 2 performs better then Alg 1
when the recall is higher.
2.12.2 ROC curve
Besides the precision-recall curve of the previous subsection, another way to visualize the
threshold-depended performance is the ROC curve. The name ROC originated in signal de-
tection theory and it stands for “Receiver Operating Characteristic”. The ROC curve depicts the
false positive rate, FPRC = FPC/N , as the function of recall (also called true positive rate or
sensitivity). Figure 2.12.2 shows the ROC-curves of the algorithms of Figure 2.12.1.
The area under the ROC-curve (AUC) is a frequently used classifier performance indicator.
Obviously 0 ≤ AUC ≤ 1. If AUC = 1, then the algorithm works perfectly for all possible
thresholds. For the random algorithm AUCR = 0.5. If AUC ≤ 0.5, the curve is below the
random line and the algorithm can be improved to reach at least 0.5 − AUC by inverting its
decision. It is shown in [52] that for randomly selected p ∈ S and q ∈ N , AUCC is the
probability of classifier C output a pair of predictions with C(p) > C(q).
2.12.3 Cross-validation
When there is no dedicated test set available, we evaluate our methods by using cross validation.
In case of k-way cross validation, we partition our training data into k disjoint sets of size n/k.
We select k − 1 sets and train the algorithm on these (k − 1)n/k instances and evaluate on
the remaining n/k instances. Afterwards this procedure is repeated k times, each time with a
different set of the n/k instances left out of the training data.










































Figure 2.6: ROC curve of two example algorithms
Chapter 3
Nature and Typology of Spam
In this chapter we provide the background about web spamming and search engine optimization.
in Section 3.2 we give an overview of typical spamming techniques based on the survey of
Gyöngyi ([64]). In Section 3.3 we discuss some of the best known spam combating methods.
3.1 Related work
With the advent of search engines web spamming appeared as early as 1996 [35, 125]. The first
generation of search engines relied mostly on the classic vector space model of information
retrieval. Thus web spam pioneers manipulated the content of web pages by stuffing it with
keywords repeated several times.
Fetterly et al. [53] (Section 3.3.1) demonstrated that a sizable portion of machine generated
spam pages can be identified through statistical analysis. Outliers in the distribution of various
web page properties – including host names and IP addresses, in- and out-degrees, page content
and rate of change – are shown to be mostly caused by web spam. As a follow-up [96] built
a classifier operating on these and other content based features. [54] presents methods for
detecting pages with a large number of phrases appearing in other web pages as well. Sites
exhibiting excessive phrase reuse are found to be either template driven or spam, employing the
so called stitching technique.
As for a broader outlook, email spam is thoroughly discussed in the conference proceedings
[68]. The sensitivity of e-commerce collaborative filtering algorithms to spam attacks is ana-
lyzed empirically in [80]. [48] present spam resistant algorithms for rank aggregation in meta
search engines.
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3.2 Spam Types
Spam techniques can be categorized in several ways. Based on the purpose, spam techniques
can be categorized into two categories. Boosting is the technique that is applied in order to
increase the relevance of pages undeservedly which is the main purpose of spamming. Hiding
does not influence the machine calculated relevance of the page but hides the boosting tech-
niques from human users.
Spam techniques can be categorized by their target ranking signal as well, which can be
both based on the content and the link structure of the Web pages. Correspondingly there are
spam techniques that target the content and the link based components of ranking algorithms.
Content spam usually manipulates the textual content of the page, while link spam is the creation
of artificial link structure that misleads the search engines and increases the relevance of target
pages.
3.2.1 Content spam
Most content based ranking methods (Section 2.5.1) rely on the assumption that a page is rel-
evant to a query if the query terms appear on the page. The more times they appear, the more
relevant the page is. This allows spammers to create pages that are relevant for many queries by
adding a large number of terms. On the other hand, spammers can increase the relevance of a
page for a few queries by the repetition of query terms. The search engine relevance score also
depends on page-independent properties of the query terms (e.g. global frequency in corpus)
but these properties are practically inaccessible for spammers except for possibly the very rare
words.
According to Gyöngyi et al. [64], the most popular content spamming techniques are:
• Repetition of a few terms. By adding the same word multiple times, the TF score of the
given term increases and the document may get ranked higher for queries containing the
repeated term.
• Dumping of a large number of distinct terms. Spammers can copy whole dictionaries and
they can add misspelled versions of popular query terms. This increases the number of
queries matched by the document.
• Weaving of spam terms into copied content (news articles or wikipedia). Its effect is
similar to dumping: the document may seem to be relevant to more queries. It is a hiding
technique as well, because the copied content may be of high quality that makes the
document structure look reasonable.
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Figure 3.1: Spam page with repetition and dumping of keywords
• Phrase stitching is the concatenation of phrases and sentences from different sources. It
is similar to weaving but the copied content does not come from a single source which
makes detection difficult.
When computing the relevance score, search engines can use different weights for different
parts of the page. If the query terms appear in the title of the page, one can assume that it is more
relevant for that query than a page that contains them only in its body. This allows spammers to
achieve higher relevance boost if they add their spam content to the title of the page.
Some search engines also add the URL of the pages into their indices and use higher weights
for URL terms. This leads to the creation of long URLs likecaliforniacaliforniagoldmedal
mortgage5.comhomehomeloanloanrefinancerefinance.dahannusaprima.co.uk.
Appearance in anchor text is another important factor of the relevance score in modern
search engines. Links containing the query terms can be good indicators of relevance of the
target page. Search engines give high weight for matches in anchor text pointing to the page.
For anchor text spamming, spammers do not need to change the target page. Instead they create
other pages with links to the target page and the spam terms are added to the anchor text of these
pages. If the target page does not participate in anchor spamming of other pages, the spamming
is hidden from the eye of the viewers of the target page. This technique is often combined with
link spamming.
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3.2.2 Link spam
3.2.2.1 Link farms
Link spammers target the link-based ranking algorithms of search engines such as PageRank
and HITS. They create special link structures, the so-called link farms that mislead these algo-
rithms.
Assume that a search engine uses the number of different pages pointing to a given page
as relevance signal. This relevance score is very easily spammable. The spammer can create a
large number of pages linking to the target page at very low cost. The pages of this link farm
should be accessible for for the search engine crawler but this can achieved by adding links on
a page which is already accessible. The score computed for the target page will be the number
of pages created. Fortunately, search engines uses more robust link-based algorithms but these
algorithms can also be manipulated by large link structures.
For constructing complex link structures, spammers need webpages as supporting nodes.
Spammers can use two kinds of pages:
1. Own pages are under full control of the spammers. These pages are created by spammers.
Their content, URL and link structure is authored and designed by them.
2. Accessible pages are not owned by spammers but anybody is allowed to add content.
These can be unmoderated forums and blogposts. Spammers may add links as comments
to propagate the “reputation” of the accessible page towards the target page.
Assume that the spammers want to attack the PageRank algorithm of the search engine and
want to increase the PageRank value of a given target page t in a link farm G. To analyze this
scenario by following [22, 64], the total PageRank value of a group G is:
PR(G) = PRstatic(G) + PRin(G)− PRout(G)− PRsink(G)
where PRstatic(G) is the amount of PageRank collected by the “random jump”, PRin(G) is
received from other pages linking to G, PRout(G) is forwarded to other pages by out-links and
PRsink(G) is the PageRank lost in pages without out-links.
We describe a simple link farm that maximizes the above formula and maximizes the Page-
Rank of the target page t ∈ G.
• As many as possible owned pages are added to G to maximize PRstatic(G), a value
proportional to the size of G.
• All accessible pages link to G to maximize PRin(G)
• There are no outgoing links to minimize PRout(G).
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Figure 3.2: Link farm page.
• All pages in G link to other pages in G in order to minimize PRsink(G).
• All links from accessible and own pages link directly to t, which maximizes the incoming
PageRank of t.
• To avoid losing PageRank and to make all pages in G accessible, t links to all own pages
in G.
Several other optimal structures are described in [63].
3.2.2.2 Directory cloning
For attacking the HITS algorithm and increasing the hub score, spammers may add several out-
links to popular pages. This can achieved by copying large web directories like the Yahoo!
Directory at dir.yahoo.com or the Open Directory Project dmoz.org.
3.2.2.3 Honey Pots
Honey pots provide useful-looking information but contain links to the spam target. Accidental
links from other reputable pages to the honey pot will increase the ranking of the target page.
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Figure 3.3: Link farm page with content spam.
3.2.2.4 Spam in social media
Spammers can add links and steal PageRank from pages that are owned by a third party but
remain accessible for external users such as unmoderated blogs, forums, guest books or wikis.
3.2.2.5 Expired domains
Spammers can buy expired domains that may have links pointing to them from other inaccessi-
ble pages. This incoming PageRank can be used in a link farm.
3.2.3 Hiding
Certain spamming techniques may make the Web pages look incomprehensible and aestheti-
cally distracting that deters their potential users. This may be no problem for a member of a
boosting link farm with the sole purpose of forwarding PageRank to the target pages and no
intention to be seen by users. However, search engines employ editors who look for spam pages
in the search engine index to exclude them along with all their effect on ranking. Regular web
users may also be able to notify the search company about possible spam pages. Thus it is
worth for the spammers to hide the traces of the spamming activity from the eyes of editors and
regular users.
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3.2.3.1 Content Hiding
Content hiding may make text or links invisible when the page is rendered. There are several
techniques to make different parts of the HTML invisible:
• Color scheme: Text can be made invisible using the same color for the text and back-
ground.
• Anchor images: Links can be made invisible by using small 1x1-pixel transparent anchor
images.
• Scripts: There various ways to make HTML elements invisible using scripts, e.g. by
setting the “visible” attribute of HTML elements to false.
3.2.3.2 Redirection
Sometimes a page redirects the user’s browser to another page. This is normal if for example
the name of the site has been changed and the pages on the old site redirect to pages on the
new site. Unfortunately redirection can be used for content hiding. Search engines index the
page which redirects the user to another page and the user may not see content of the original
page. Redirection can be implemented in a number of ways. Using the refresh HTML meta tag
can be easily detected by search engines but using sophisticated scripts can make the detection
difficult.
3.2.3.3 Cloaking
Spammers may detect whether their pages are downloaded by a regular user or a search engine
crawler. They may maintain a list of IP addresses of crawlers or they may check the user agent
string that usually contains the type and version of the user browser or the search engine crawler.
If the server that hosts the spam pages knows that the request for the page comes from a
crawler, it can return a page different from the one served for browsers. The page for users can
be a legitimate page with useful content and without any sign of spamming. This page is not
supposed to be seen by search engines. On the other hand the page for crawlers does not need
to contain any useful content; normal web users will not see it.
3.3 Combating Spam
In this section we review some of the publicly known methods for combating different kinds of
web spam.
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Figure 3.4: In-degree distribution of a web graph containing a huge link farm
3.3.1 Statistics and Machine Learning
Spammers often use automated methods to generate spam pages, since for the sufficient effect,
a large number of spam pages is needed, which is hard to produce manually. However, ma-
chine generated pages tend to diverge in several statistical properties from the average human-
generated pages. In [53] Fetterly et al. propose that certain kind of spam pages can be identified
through statistical analysis. They examined several statistical properties and they found that the
outliers in the statistical distribution are mostly originated from spam pages. For spam detection
they suggest the following features:
1. Hostname length: Spammers often stuff keywords into the hostname part of the URL that
results in long hostnames.
2. Hostname per IP address: Spammers often use many different hostnames for spam pages
in link farms. To register these hostnames on different IP addresses may be very costly,
so IP addresses hosting spam pages are often assigned to more names than normal pages.
3. Host-machine-ratio: Search engines often prefer links between different sites as same-site
links are often navigational [44]. In order to increase the importance of the links inside
a link farm, spammers distribute their pages among several hostnames. However, these
hostnames may be assigned to a small number of machines due to the high cost. This
behavior can be captured by host-machine-ratio, the number of hostnames appearing in
the links of a page divided by the number of machines that the host names resolve to.
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4. In-degree: The in-degree distribution of machine generated link farms may look different
from normal pages. In Figure 3.3.1 we show the in-degree distribution of a web graph
that contains a huge link farm.
5. Out-degree: Similar to in-degree, the out-degree distribution of machine generated link
farms may look different from normal pages.
6. Amount of weekly changed content: Spam pages frequently alter their content and quite
often change it completely. Sometimes they dynamically re-generate their content every
time the user or the crawler sees it. This behavior can be detected by computing the
percentage of the weekly change in content.
7. near-duplicate cluster sizes: Spammers often use templates to generate a large number
of pages with very similar structure. These clusters of similar pages can be detected by
efficient clustering algorithms [27].
Several authors [11, 30, 96] suggested additional content and link based features that can
be used as input for machine learning methods. Most of these features were included with the
WEBSPAM-UK-2006 dataset (Section 3.4.3) and were made public for the Web Spam Chal-
lenge contest [32] where several teams used them as input for different classification methods.
In addition to the ones suggested by Fetterly, the Web Spam Challenge feature set contained
the following features as well:
1. Number of visible words in the page or its title.
2. Average length of visible words.
3. Fraction of visible words in anchor text.
4. Fraction of visible words. Relative to all words on the page including HTML tags, scripts
and other invisible text.
5. Compression rate. Ratio of compressed size (using bzip2) to uncompressed size.
6. Corpus precision and recall. Corpus precision is the fraction of words in the page that
are among the k most frequent words in the corpus. Analogously, Corpus recall is the
fraction of k most popular words that appear in the page.
7. Query precision and recall. Similar to corpus precision and recall but for words the most
frequent query terms from search query logs are used.
8. Independent trigram likelihood. It is defined as − 1
|T |
∑
t∈T log P (t), where T is the set
of trigrams (three consecutive words) in the page and P (t) is the probability of t in the
page. This value measures the independence of the distribution of trigrams.
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9. Entropy of trigrams. It is defined as −
∑
t∈T P (T ) logP (T ). This is another measure of
compressibility based on the trigram distribution.
10. Edge-reciprocity. Number of links on the page that are reciprocal (i.e. number of neigh-
boring pages that are linked in both ways).
11. Assortivity. The ratio of the degree of the page and the average degree of its neighbors.
12. PageRank. See Section 2.6.
13. TrustRank. See Section 3.3.2.
14. Estimation of supporters. Page x is a d-supporter of page y, if the shortest path from x to
y has length d. The probabilistic algorithm used estimating the number of supporters is
described in [10].
3.3.2 TrustRank
TrustRank introduced by Gyöngyi et al. [65] is based on the idea that trustworthy pages mostly
link to other trustworthy pages and rarely link to spam pages. Given a seed set of trustworthy
pages, trust can be propagated along the links to unknown pages. Based on the assumption,
spam pages are “far” from the seed set and several propagation step needed to reach these
pages.
The algorithm assigns trust scores to each page. The seed set D have an initial positive trust
score and all other pages are assigned zero score:
t0,i =
⎧⎨
⎩1/|D| if i ∈ D0 otherwise (3.1)
The propagation is very similar to personalized PageRank in Section 2.6:
ti+1 = αBti + (1− α)t0, (3.2)
where ti is the vector of trust scores in iteration i, B is transition matrix as defined in Section 2.6
and α is the decay factor. Compared to the PageRank equation (2.8), (1−α) is the teleportation
probability and t0 is the personalization vector.
In the original definition of TrustRank, 20 iterations were performed with α = 0.85. Evalu-
ation results show that good pages receive higher trust scores than spam pages.
The most crucial phase of the algorithm is the seed set selection. Gyöngyi et al. applied
an extremely rigorous criteria for selecting pages for the seed set. First they computed an
inverse PageRank on the site-level web graph to identify sites from which many other sites are
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reachable. From the 25,000 sites with the highest inverse PageRank, they removed the ones that
were not listed in the major web dictionaries. Out of the remaining sites they manually selected
178 sites. They selected only those sites that had a clear identifiable authority controlling the
content.
3.4 Spam Data
Our experiments are based on several data sets that we describe below. Note that it is computa-
tionally time consuming and expensive to re-run earlier experiments on new data sets, hence in
this thesis we preserve the setup of the original experiments.
3.4.1 SpamRank (.de) dataset
Our German (.de) data set was provided by Torsten Suel and Yen-Yu Chen. The data set
includes the web graph and the set of URLs extracted from a 31.2 M page crawl of the .de
domain. The crawl was carried out by the Polybot crawler [117] in April 2004. This German
graph is denser than the usual web graphs, it has 962 M edges, which implies an average out-
degree of 30.82.
We chose a subset of urls for manual evaluation using the method presented in [65]. First
we ordered the pages according to their PageRank value and assigned them to 20 consecutive
buckets such that each bucket contained 5% of the total PageRank sum with bucket 1 containing
the page with the highest PageRank. From each bucket we chose 50 URLs uniformly at random,
resulting in a 1000 page sample heavily biased toward pages with high PageRank. Three of us
received a 400 page subset of the sample, which we manually classified into one of the following
categories: reputable, web organization, advertisement, spam, non-existent, empty, alias, and
unknown (see [65] for detailed definition of the categories).
We observed a poor pairwise κ value [29] of 0.45 over the 100 pairs of common URLs. The
majority of disagreements could be attributed to different rating of pages in affiliate programs
and certain cliques. This shows that assessing link spam is nontrivial task for humans as well.
By considering all remarks available concerning the judgements over the common set of URLs
and using the experience gathered so far, one of the authors revised the classifications for the
full 1000 page sample.
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the categories among the sample. Throwing away the
non-existent, empty, unknown and alias pages gave us a usable 910 page sample. Note that the
proportion of spam pages in our sample is somewhat higher than in previous studies [53, 65].
We attribute this to the denser web graph and the known notoriousness of spammers over the
.de domain [54].











Figure 3.5: Distribution of categories in the evaluation sample
We observe relative fast changes among sample pages over time, in particular spam pages
changing to non-existent. Judgements after final revision reflect the state as of April 2005.
3.4.2 .ch dataset
The search.ch data is a 2004 crawl of approximately 20 M pages mostly from the .ch
domain. We used the domain graph with 300 K nodes and 24 M edges reflecting the connectivity
of the two highest levels of the domain hierarchy within this dataset [126].
For our TrustRank experiments, 19605 domains appearing in the URL list extracted by
Wu et al. [127] from the Switzerland specific ODP [97] topics formed our trusted set. As
spam seed set, we used a labeled list of 728 domains provided by search.ch [105]. One
particular property of this blacklist is that 627 domains share 144 different IP addresses, while
the remaining 101 could no longer be resolved at the time of the experiments in June 2006.
3.4.3 .uk dataset
The WEBSPAM-UK2006 dataset was compiled by Castillo et al. [32] for the Web Spam Chal-
lenge as a standard means of measuring the performance of Web spam detection algorithms.
This corpus consists of 77 million pages from 11,400 hosts. These pages have been an-
notated at the level of hosts. The evaluation sample consists of 71% of the hosts classified as
normal, 25% as spam and the remainder 4% as undecided. In our experiment, we used the more
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reliable Domain Or Two Humans sample that required agreement among raters and introduces
additional nonspam domains using reputable web directories. This sample contains 10% spam
among the 5622 labeled sites.
The Web Spam Challenge consisted of two phases. Phase I focused on both Information
Retrieval and Machine Learning. Phase II focused on Machine Learning only. In Phase I every
attributes of the pages were available including page content, web graph, the precomputed fea-
tures described in Section 3.3.1 and the evaluation labels. In Phase II the data was anonymized,
only the features, the labels and web graph were available.
3.4.4 Data sets and methodology
In this section, we elaborate on the hardness of comparing results of different authors and data
sets. Results on Web spam are in general based on data that needs careful analysis to replicate
and compare.
In contrast to the hardness of manual spam classification, apart from the SpamRank exper-
iment Chapter 4 our previous result we have no knowledge of investigations for the reliability
of the manual labels.
For the .de dataset (Subsection3.4.1), we reported a very poor pairwise κ = 0.45 [29] over
the 100 pairs of URLs with judgements by two different evaluators which shows that assessing
link spam is nontrivial task for humans as well. Gyöngyi et al. [65] mention “using an author
as an evaluator raises the issue of bias in the results” and emphasize the expertise needed for
search engine operators that, in our work, have no access. They also describe the hardness of
the task as “manual evaluations took weeks: checking a site involves looking at many of its
pages and also the linked sites to determine if there is an intention to deceive search engines.”
Various top-level or otherwise selected domains may have different spamming behavior;
Ntoulas et al. [96] give an invaluable comparison that show major differences among national
domains and languages of the page. For the .de domain their findings agree with our 16.5%
Section 3.4.1 while for the .uk domain together with Becchetti et al. [11] they report approxi-
mately 6%; the latter measurement also reports 16% of sites as spam over .uk.
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Chapter 4
SpamRank: a method based on supporter
irregularity estimation
In this chapter we concentrate on identifying pages backlinked by a large amount of other pages
in order to mislead search engines to rank their target higher. Our main goal is to compute
for each Web page a SpamRank value that measures the amount of the undeserved PageRank
[98] of a page. Note that by the nature of our methods we make no distinction between fair or
malicious intent and our algorithm will likely rank pages with a large amount of low quality
backlinks as spam.
We assume that spammed pages have a biased distribution of supporter pages that con-
tribute to the undeserved high PageRank value. As described in detail in Section 4.2, a node’s
PageRank is equal to the average of its personalized PageRank where personalization is over
all Web pages. By the recent algorithm of [57] we are able to approximately compute all these
values in order to deduce a large fraction of the origin of the node’s PageRank value.
Our key assumption is that supporters of an honest page should not be overly dependent on
one another, i.e. they should be spread across sources of different quality. Just as in the case
of the entire Web, the PageRank distribution of an honest set of supporters should be power
law. Particular examples that raise suspicion when a page receives its PageRank only from very
low ranked pages (and then from a very large number of them); such a page has little quality
support that makes the fairness of the large number of low-quality supporters questionable.
Another example is a set of supporters, all with PageRank values falling into a narrow interval.
In this case the large number of similar objects raise the suspicion that they appear by certain
means of a cooperation.
The two key observations in detecting link farms, colluding pages or other means of Page-
Rank boosting in the neighborhood of a page are the following:
• Portions of the Web are self-similar; an honest set of supporter pages arise by independent
actions of individuals and organizations that build a structure with properties similar to the
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entire Web. In particular, the PageRank of the supporters follows a power law distribution
just as the case for the entire Web.
• Link spammers have a limited budget; when boosting the PageRank of a target page,
“unimportant” structures are not replicated.
A perfect form of a link spam is certainly a full replica of the entire Web that automatic link
based methods are unable to distinguish from the original, honest copy. Our method hence
targets at finding the missing statistical features of dishonest page sets. In our experiment the
power law distribution acts as this feature; we remark that (i) other features may perform well
and (ii) our algorithm can be fooled by targeting a link farm towards the particular statisti-
cal property we employ, hence in a practical application a large number of features should be
combined that should probably include non-link based methods as well.
Our algorithm to define SpamRank, a value that measures the amount of undeserved Page-
Rank score of a Web page, consist of three main steps; the overall structure is given in Algo-
rithm 4.3.1. First we select the supporters of each given page i in its multi-step neighborhood
with the weight of the probability that a PageRank type random walk terminates at i. We per-
form this step by a Monte Carlo personalized PageRank simulation described in Section 4.2.
Then in the second phase we identify pages i with a poor structure of supporters that appear to
form a link farm or certain form of an artificially created page set. We penalize pages j that
support i. This step is performed target by target; we measure the similarity of the PageRank his-
togram of sources to an ideal power law model suggested by [8, 79] described in Section 4.3.1.
Then in the third step we simply personalize PageRank on the penalties of pages j. This last
step concentrates suspicious activities to their targets; in another way to state, we determine
SpamRank by a back-and-forth iteration between targets and sources.
Some sites are distributed to so many pages across a large number of domain names that
attain undeserved PageRank for these pages. While methods such as HostRank [49] and the site
boundary detection of [44] also handle these sites, we also notice their undeserved PageRank
value by giving penalties for these sites. The natural idea of combining methods is beyond the
scope of the current report.
Bibliographical notes
SpamRank is one of the earliest results on web spam filtering. It appeared in [13], accepted for
publication in Information Retrieval. Results in this chapter represent a joint work with András
Benczúr, Tamás Sarlós, and Máté Uher. The conference version is cited by 54 publications. My
contribution is the evaluation part, the algorithmic details and ideas on feature generation.
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4.1 Related work
Following Google’s success all major search engines quickly incorporated link analysis algo-
rithms such as HITS [76] and PageRank [98] into their ranking schemes. The birth of the highly
successful PageRank algorithm [98] was indeed partially motivated by the easy spammability
of the simple in-degree count. However [22] proved that for any link farm and any target set of
pages such that each target page is pointed to by at least one link farm page the sum of Page-
Rank over the target set’s nodes is at least large as a linear function of the number of pages in
the link farm.
HITS was improved by [20] to reduce its sensitivity to mutually reinforcing relationships
between hosts. [21] also observed that dense connectivity of seemingly unrelated sites is often
due to spam and affiliate programs. Generally, [23, 83, 108] discuss the (negative) effects
of dense subgraphs (known as tightly-knit communities, TKCs) on HITS and other related
algorithms.
Section 7 of [81] and the references therein give an overview of the theoretical results un-
derlying the TKC effect that indicate a very weak TKC-type spam resistance of HITS and a
somewhat better but still unsatisfying one of PageRank. The results show that HITS is unstable,
its hub and authority ranking values can change by an arbitrary large amount if the input graph
is perturbed. On the other hand, PageRank values are stable, but the ranking order induced by
them is still unstable [84].
[44] applied a decision tree trained on a broad set of features to distinguish navigational and
link-spam (dubbed as nepotistic) links from the good ones. To the best of our knowledge Davi-
son’s work is the first openly published research paper explicitly devoted to the identification
of link spam. More recently [1] extracted features based on the linkage patterns of web sites.
Clustering of the feature space produced a decent amount clusters whose members appeared to
belong to the same spam ring.
The article of [49] give evidence that HostRank – PageRank calculated over the host graph –
is more resilient against link spam. HostRank’s top list contained far fewer questionable URLs
than PageRank’s because of the relatively reduced weight given to link farm sites. This finding
is in good agreement with the before mentioned linear spammability of PageRank [22].
Moreover [65] (Section 3.3.2) shows that spam sites can be further pushed down in Host-
Rank ordering if we personalize HostRank on a few trusted hub sites. Their method is semi
automatic, the trusted 180 seed pages were carefully hand picked from 1250 good hub pages
distilled automatically using Inverse PageRank. Further enhancements of the TrustRank ap-
proach are presented in [66, 127, 128]. From the same authors, [64] gives a detailed taxonomy
of current web spamming techniques; [63] studies the interconnection strategies of two or more
link farms.
Zhang et al. [129] argue that the PageRank of colluding nodes (i.e. pages within the same
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dense, cliquish subgraph) is highly correlated with 1/ε, where ε denotes the teleportation prob-
ability. Their method increases the probability of jump from nodes with large correlation co-
efficients. The resulting Adaptive Epsilon scheme is shown to be resistant against artificial,
hand-made manipulations implanted by the authors to a real world web graph crawled by the
Stanford WebBase project. [6] improve Zhang et al.’s analysis and experimentally study the
effect of various collusion topologies.
A seed set of link farm pages is identified by [126]’s heuristic based on the observation that
the in- and out-neighborhood of link farm pages tend to overlap. Then the seed set of bad pages
is iteratively extended to other pages which link to many bad pages; finally the links between
bad pages are dropped. Experiments show that a simple weighted in-degree scheme on the
modified graph yields significantly better precision for top ten page hit lists than the [20] HITS
variant. Moreover link farm sites with not too high original HostRank suffer a drastic loss when
HostRank is calculated over the pruned graph. Polluting blogs, wikis and message boards is an
other popular link spamming technique, prompting the recent introduction of the rel="nofollo[a-
zA-Z] attribute for hyperlinks by the major search engines [113]. [92] demonstrates that the
distribution of words (a unigram language model) is a strong feature for telling legitimate and
spam comments apart.
4.2 Preliminaries
In this section we briefly introduce notation, and recall definitions and some facts about person-
alized PageRank from Section 2.7. We also describe the Monte Carlo simulation for Personal-
ized PageRank of [57].
Let p denote the uniform PageRank vector and PPR(r) denote the personalized PageRank








where χv is the teleportation vector consisting of all 0 except for node v where χv(v) = 1. In
other words, page v supports i to the extent PPRi(χv)
In order to compute personalized pagerank efficiently, we used the Monte-Carlo approxima-
tion of [57] (Section 2.7). We generate a few thousand random walks starting at vertex j, add
up probabilities ε(1− ε)t for their endpoints i and use this sum as an estimator of PPR(χj)i.
The overall idea is summarized in Algorithm 4.2.1; we use the implementation described in
[57] that differs from the above simplified description in two key aspects. First, for efficiency
random walks are generated edge by edge; in one iteration each random walk is augmented by
an edge. For such an iteration the set of random walks is sorted by their endvertex; then the
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iteration can be performed in a single edge scan of the Web graph. Finally we need a last sort
over the set of random walks by endvertex; then for a single endvertex i all vertices are collected
that support vertex i.
Algorithm 4.2.1 Phase 1 outline for finding supporters by Monte Carlo simulation. Actual
implementation uses external sort [57].
for all Web pages j do
for  = 1, . . . , N = 1000 do
t ← random value from geometric distribution with parameter ε
i ← endvertex of a random walk of length t starting at j
Supporti,j ← Supporti,j + 1/N
4.3 The SpamRank Algorithm
We define SpamRank, a measure of undeserved PageRank share of Web page, through a
three-phase algorithm (Algorithm 4.3.1). The algorithm first identifies candidate sources of
undeserved PageRank scores. In Phase 1 we select the supporters of each page by the Monte
Carlo simulation of [57]. Then in Phase 2 pages receive penalties based on how many potential
targets are affected and how strong is the influence on their PageRank values. Finally in Phase 3
we define SpamRank as PageRank personalized on the vector of penalties, in a similar way as,
by folklore information, Google’s BadRank [102, 126] is computed (on the Web graph with
reverse edge direction) personalized on identified spam.
In Phase 1 (Algorithm 4.2.1) we compute the approximate personalized PageRank vector
of all pages j. We use the Monte Carlo approximation of [57]; this algorithm under practi-
cally useful parameter settings computes a set of roughly 1,000 nodes i together with a weight
Supporti,j. This weight can be interpreted as the probability that a random PageRank walk
starting at j will end in i.
Before proceeding with the penalty computation in Phase 2, we invert our data (by an ex-
ternal sort) and for each page i we consider the list of pages j such that i is ranked high when
personalized on j; the strength is given by Supporti,j as above. Notice that Supporti,j arises
from a Monte Carlo simulation and hence its value is 0 for all j where the actual personalized
PageRank value is negligible.
For a fixed page i, penalties are defined by considering the PageRank histogram of all j with
Supporti,j > 0 for pages that receive enough supporters. Pages with less than n0 supporters
(in our experiment n0 = 1000) are ignored; supporter pages that spread their personalized
PageRank to targets with less than n0 incoming paths are of little spamming power anyway.
In the heart of our algorithm we find the method of identifying irregularities in the PageRank
distribution of a page’s supporters; we present its details in Section 4.3.2. Given such a measure
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Algorithm 4.3.1 Overall Structure of SpamRank Algorithm
for all Web pages i do
Supporti,· ← empty sparse vector of reals
Phase 1: Supporter Generation
generate nodes into vector Supporti,· that have high contribution in the PageRank of i
Phase 2: Penalization
for all Web pages i do
give Penaltyj based on irregular behavior of PageRank over Supporti,j
Phase 3: SpamRank as Personalized PageRank (PPR) over Penalties
SpamRank ← PPR(Penalty)
Algorithm 4.3.2 Phase 2 Penalty Calculation for Web pages, two variants.
Initialize vector Penalty by all 0
for all Web pages i with at least n0 supporters j with nonzero Supporti,j do
ρ ← regularity of the supporters of i {See Algorithm 4.3.3}
if ρ < ρ0 then
for all Web pages j with Supporti,j > 0 do
Penaltyj ← Penaltyj +
{
(ρ0 − ρ) {Variant I}
(ρ0 − ρ) · Supporti,j {Variant II}
{we use ρ0 = 0.85}
for all Web pages j do
if Penaltyj > 1 then
Penaltyj ← 1
ρ ≤ 1 where ρ = 1 means perfect regularity, we proceed by penalizing all the supporter pages
proportional to (ρ0 − ρ) if the measure is below a threshold ρ0. In our experiments the variant
where penalties are also proportional to the strength of the support, Supporti,j, proves slightly
more effective. Also we put an upper limit of 1 for the penalties of a single page; penalties
otherwise accumulate for pages that participate in several irregular supporter sets.
4.3.1 Global properties of the Web graph
The fully automatic detection of irregular sets of supporters forms crucial part of our algorithm,
hence we briefly describe the intuition behind our method. Key ingredients are
• Rich get richer evolving models: The in-degree and the PageRank of a broad enough set
of pages should follow power law distribution.
• Self-similarity: A large-enough supporter set should behave similar to the entire Web.
We build on the models of evolution of Web discussed in Section 2.2.3 that predicts a power
law degree distribution (Section 2.2.3). The distribution of PageRank behaves very similar
to that of the in-degree as noticed among others in [99]. In all Web crawls considered by
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experiments PageRank has a power law distribution. Clearly PageRank and in-degree should
be related as each page has its ε/N teleportation share of PageRank and propagates this value
through out-links. Figures about PageRank and in-degree correlation vary; some claim a value
close to 0 but typically a moderate value close to 0.5 is reported; as an example, the authors of
[82] corrected their initial low correlation value to 0.34 in personal communication.
When looking at individual pages, models could in theory completely lose all their predic-
tive power. In practice however strong self-similarity of various portions of the Web is observed
[8, 46] that may indicate that the PageRank in a neighborhood should have the same statistical
properties as in the entire Web.
Stating in an opposite way, we argue that the neighborhood of a spam page will look dif-
ferent from an honest one. The neighborhood of a link spam will consist of a large number of
artificially generated links. These links likely come from similar objects; the same fine gran-
ularity obtained by the rich gets richer principle is harder to be locally replicated. In present
work we use the very simple PageRank distribution statistics that, although not hard to artifi-
cially generate, works well since unknown for spammers. In a real life situation more complex
properties can be considered in response to spamming techniques.
4.3.2 Phase 2: Penalty generation
We are ready to fill in the last detail (Algorithm 4.3.3) of our SpamRank algorithm. Firstly for
a page i we may consider the histogram of either the PageRank of all of its supporter pages j
with Supporti,j > 0 or the product Supporti,j · PageRankj for all pages. While the latter variant
appears more sophisticated, in our experiments we find Variant A perform slightly better.
Algorithm 4.3.3 Irregularity Calculation for Web page i, two variants.
Create a list of buckets for k = 0, 1, . . .




Supporti,j · PageRankj {Variant B}
Add j to bucket k with a · bk < r ≤ a · bk−1 {we use a = 1.0, b = 0.7}
Let kmin = min{k : |bucketk| > 0}, kmax = max{k : |bucketk| > 0}
for all buckets k = kmin, . . . , kmax do
Xk ← k, Yk ←
{
log(|bucketk|) if |bucketk| > 0
0 if |bucketk| = 0
ρ ← Pearson-correlation(X,−Y )
Given the PageRank histogram as above, we use a very simple approach to test its fit to
a power law distribution. We split pages into buckets by PageRank; we let bucket boundary
values grow exponentially as a · bk. We use a = 1.0 and b = 0.7; the choice has little effect on
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the results. If the PageRank values follow a power law distribution such that the -th page in
order has rank proportional to c · −α, then the theoretic size of bucket k should be
∫ a·bk
a·bk+1
c · −α d = c′(bk·(−α+1) − b(k+1)·(−α+1))
= c′′bk·(−α+1).
Hence logarithm of the theoretical count within bucket k is linear in k. In our algorithm we
penalize proportional to the Pearson correlation coefficient between the index and the logarithm
of the count within the bucket as one possible measure for testing a line fit over the data.
4.4 Experiments
We used the 31.2 M page crawl of the .de domain described in Section 3.4.1.
While all the algorithms mentioned in Section 4.3 can be implemented both in external
memory and in a distributed network of workstations, we applied a trivial graph compression
method to speed our experiments up by using internal memory. The compressed graph size is
1.3 GB. Computing the Monte Carlo Personalized PageRank for all the nodes took 17 hours,
creating the inverted PPR database required 4 hours and resulted in a 14 GB database. Deter-
mining SpamRank’s personalization vector took 20 minutes, which was followed by another 20
minutes of PageRank computation by simple power method. All programs were run on a single
Pentium 4 3.0 GHz machine with Linux OS.
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of categories among the sample. Because of the abundance
of pages from the eBay.de domain – 0.8 M pages in the dataset – and due to the misuse of its
affiliation program, we decided to treat pages from eBay.de as a separate subcategory in the
next two figures.
Figure 4.1 depicts the distribution of each category conditioned on the PageRank bucket. It
can clearly be seen that a large amount of spam pages made it to the top two PageRank buckets
where the percentage of spam is even higher than in the full sample.
Using the SpamRank ordering we again assigned each page to one of the 20 SpamRank
buckets, the ith SpamRank bucket having exactly the same number of pages in it as the ith
PageRank bucket. Figure 4.2 demonstrates that the first four SpamRank buckets contain a very
large amount of spam; these buckets are low in truly reputable non-eBay content.
It is important to note that the ordering induced by SpamRank is very different from Page-
Rank, therefore we cannot assess the properties of SpamRank using traditional precision/recall
curves calculated over the original sample as it was drawn according to the PageRank distribu-
tion. We refrained from classifying a complete new sample according to the SpamRank distri-





































Figure 4.2: Distribution of categories among SpamRank buckets. Sampling is stratified using
PageRank.



















Figure 4.3: Distribution of categories among the top 5 SpamRank buckets. Sampling is stratified
using SpamRank.
buckets. As it can be seen in Figure 4.3 the top SpamRank buckets are rich in spam pages,
though more than half of the pages in these buckets are not spam. Manual inspection of the
non-spam pages revealed that they are predominantly pages from sites with dense, templatic
internal structure such as forums, online retail catalogues and structured document archives. In
terms of PageRank, the machine generated internal link structure of these sites behaves exactly
like a large link farm, therefore we believe it is justified to mark them as pages with artificially
inflated PageRank value.
Finally in Figure 4.4 we plotted the average difference between the PageRank and Spam-
Rank bucket number. For each page in the sample we calculated PageRank and SpamRank and
determined bucket numbers for both measures. Then within each PageRank bucket (horizon-
tal axis) we averaged the difference of PageRank and SpamRank bucket number separately for
spam and reputable pages (including eBay.de). The average demotion in SpamRank com-
pared to PageRank is significantly higher for reputable pages. The (small) positive demotion
for spam pages is explained by the fact that the top SpamRank buckets contain a number of
fresh, either spammy or cliquish pages (see Figure 4.3) not included in the original sample.
4.5 Discussion
In this section we elaborate on the issue of false positives (non-spam pages marked as spam)
and false negatives (spam pages marked as non-spam) with SpamRank. As noted in Section


























Figure 4.4: Difference of SpamRank and PageRank bucket numbers (demotion) averaged within
each PageRank bucket (horizontal axis) separate for spam and reputable pages of the sample.
spam. It is expected that initial data cleaning with methods suitable for downweighting [75] or
removing [59] templatic, machine generated intra-site links would reduce these false positive
signals in SpamRank. On the other hand, as a side effect of our method we may penalize
reputable pages often cited in blogs and lists if the citing (reputable) blogs and lists themselves
are target of comment spam attack [92]. One such (ironic) example was for example a news
page about the rel="nofollow" tag [113].
Turning to malicious attacks, let us consider the following simplified thought experiment.
Suppose that there is an honest page P with perfectly regular supporters reflected by the cor-
relation coefficient ρ = 1 (see Section 4.3.2 for a definition). There is also an evil competitor
C who wishes to make P look like spam, i.e. C carries out a “nuke” attack according to the
terminology of [80]. Again, for simplicity, let us assume that C generates a large number of
new pages pointing to P in order to masquerade the supporters of P as of low quality.
In order to estimate how much effort C needs in order to succeed we recall some basic facts




the total variance of the x values. If the best fitting line has the form y = a + bx then squared
error of the inverse y → x fit is σ2x|y =
∑
k(xk − (yk − a)/b)
2. The square of the correlation of




Applying the correlation equations within the SpamRank algorithm, we can think of xk as k
as it corresponds to the bucket number of the supporters based on their PageRank and we have
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yk as the logarithm of the number of supporters falling into the kth bucket. In the simple case
of the single bucket modification we may assume that σ2x|y = 0 holds before the attack and σx
remains unchanged. It is easy to see that y1 needs to be increased by a constant amount in order
to drive down ρ2xy from 1 to below 0.852. However as y1 denotes the log, the actual number
of supporters in the first bucket needs to increased by a constant multiplicative factor. Thus a
successful attack requires an effort comparable to the number of original supporters which is
closely related to the PageRank of the honest page. Consequently obscure pages are easy targets
but more popular pages are well protected against nuke attacks in SpamRank.
Finally, let us consider “push” attacks [80] when the attacker wishes to hide a spam page,
causing a false negative error. As [98] wrote “... any evaluation strategy which counts replicable
features of web pages is prone to manipulation.” SpamRank is no exception either. If an attacker
creates an isolated community of K web pages then the total amount of PageRank distributed
over the community is proportional to K assuming that K is much smaller than the size of
the entire web graph. If all nodes connect directly to a central node in order to maximize its
PageRank [63], then the highest PageRank will be proportional to (1 − ε) · K, where 1 − ε
denotes the damping factor, however this structure is easily detected. A sophisticated attacker
dodging SpamRank could generate a random graph such that the PageRank distribution follows
a power law with exponent −α [99]. Then the highest PageRank within the link farm will
be proportional to (1 − ε)K/ζ(α), where ζ is the Riemann ζ function. Hence, unfortunately,
the number of nodes created needs to be increased only by a constant factor compared to the
brute-force attack to achieve the same level PageRank.
In present work we measure the richness of the supporters by the very simple PageRank
distribution statistics that works well since unknown for spammers but, as seen, requires only
by a constant more effort to replicate. To increase robustness we recommend more complex
properties in response to spamming techniques where the recent content-based statistics of [96]
are particularly promising.
4.6 Conclusions
We presented SpamRank, a three-stage, scalable Monte Carlo algorithm for computing a per-
sonalized PageRank vector biased toward link spam pages. Our experiments demonstrated that
SpamRank is indeed capable of differentiating among spam and non-spam pages. A number of
questions left to subsequent work are as follows. Explore the effects of parameters and assess
variants of the algorithm (e.g. penalty dependent on the PageRank of a suspicious target page).
Produce a ranking that retains the reputable part of PageRank. Incorporate SpamRank into a
ranking function and measure its effect on precision for popular or financially lucrative queries.
Lastly compare and evaluate SpamRank against Adaptive Epsilon [129] and Wu and Davison’s
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method [126], the other publicly known PageRank schemes designed to be spam-resistant with-
out human effort.
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Chapter 5
Link-based similarity
Several results has appeared that apply rank propagation to extend initial trust or distrust judge-
ments over a small set of seed pages or sites to the entire web. These methods are either based
on propagating trust forward or distrust backwards along the hyperlinks based on the idea that
honest pages predominantly point to honest ones, or, stated the other way, spam pages are back-
linked only by spam pages.
In this chapter we concentrate on spreading trust and distrust information from a seed set
with the help of hyperlink based similarity measures. We argue that compared to unidirec-
tional propagation methods, the initial labels are better utilized if we apply similarity search
techniques, which involve a bidirectional backward and forward steps.
Our main goal is to identify features based on similarities to known honest and spam pages
that can be used to classify unknown pages. We demonstrate the usability of co-citation, Com-
panion [45], SimRank [71] and variants [56] as well as the singular value decomposition of the
adjacency matrix in supervised spam learning.
Hyperlink based similarity to spam versus honest pages is comparable to trust and distrust
propagation while giving a natural combination of backward and forward propagation. Given
a link farm alliance [63] with one known target labeled as spam, similarity based features will
automatically label other targets as spam as well.
As our main result, we show that over our data set of the .de domain as well as the .ch do-
main data in courtesy of the search.ch engine [105] similarity based single features perform
better than trust or distrust propagation based single features at higher recall values. Ironi-
cally, the easiest-to-manipulate co-citation performs best; as an alternate somewhat more robust
against manipulations but performing similarly well we suggest Companion [45]. Our results
are complementary to the recent results of [11] based on link structure and of [96] based on
content analysis.
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Bibliographical notes
This chapter’s results appeared in [14] and represent a joint work with András Benczúr and
Tamás Sarlós. My contribution is the evaluation, design and efficient implementation of the
similarity algorithms.
5.1 Related results
Next we survey related results both for hyperlink based spam detection and similarity search.
Very large number of results appeared to fight spam; we list just the most relevant ones and
point to references therein.
5.1.1 PageRank based trust and distrust propagation
When using trust and distrust information, we may propagate trust forward to pages pointed
by trusted ones or distrust backward to pages that point to spam. In previous results we see
all variants: TrustRank ([65, 128] Section 3.3.2). propagates trust forward, BadRank [47, 102]
distrust backward; [127] uses a combination. We describe these important predecessors of our
work next.
As the first trust propagation method against link spam, Gyöngyi et al. [65] show that spam
sites can be pushed down in PageRank ordering if we personalize on a few trusted hub sites.
Their method is semi automatic, the trusted 180 seed pages were carefully hand picked from
1250 good hub pages distilled automatically using Inverse PageRank. Notice that TrustRank
requires a very carefully selected seed set that we cannot provide in our experiment. Wu et
al. [128] describes an improvement of TrustRank by reducing the bias induced by the seed set.
Gyöngyi et al. [66] recognize link spam by comparing the TrustRank and PageRank values.
Trust and distrust propagation in trust networks originates in Guha et al. [60] for trust net-
works; Wu et al. [127] show its applicability for Web spam classification. As noticed by [60]
distrust propagation is more problematic that that of trust. Although for a different data type
(trust/distrust among Epinions reviewers), they raise the question of interpreting the distrust of
a distrusted party. While [127] emphasizes the difference between identifying preferences of a
single user and a global notion of trust over the Web, they also require a combination of trust
and distrust propagation to achieve best results.
As an earlier result, [74] EigenTrust is PageRank with weights that are trust values. Another
method [91] penalizes the biconnected component of a spam page in a subgraph obtained by
backward distrust propagation.
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5.1.2 Similarity search, HITS and spam
Several link-based algorithms were designed to evaluate node-to-node similarities in networks;
we refer to [85] for an exhaustive list of the available methods ranging from co-citation to more
complex measures such as max-flow/min-cut-based similarities of [90] in the vicinity graph of
the query. Closest to our notions of link based similarity is co-citation already used in [60] as
an elementary step of trust propagation.
Dean and Henzinger [45] describe the Companion algorithm that is reported to outperform
co-citation in finding related pages. Their algorithm computes the authority scores by the HITS
algorithm ([76] Section 2.8) in the vicinity of the query page.
HITS itself is known to be vulnerable to spam and in particular to the so-called tightly knit
community (TKC) effect. Vulnerability to spam, however, makes HITS a good candidate to
actually detect spam when run in the neighborhood of known spam pages. An overview of the
theoretical results underlying the TKC effect is given in Section 7 of [81] and the references
therein that indicate a very weak TKC-type spam resistance of HITS and a somewhat better but
still unsatisfying one of PageRank.
Another example of HITS and spam is the result of Wu and Davison [126]. Unlike our
approach of exploiting the spam sensibility of HITS in prediction, they make HITS spam re-
sistant by identifying a seed set of link farm pages based on the observation that the in- and
out-neighborhood of link farm pages tend to overlap. Then the seed set of bad pages is iter-
atively extended to other pages which link to many bad pages; finally the links between bad
pages are dropped. Experiments show that a simple weighted in-degree scheme on the modified
graph yields significantly better precision for top ten page hit lists than the Bharat-Henzinger
[20] HITS variant.
Additionally we mention the first example that gives anecdotal evidence for the usability of
similarities in hyperlink structure to identify spam. Amitay et al. [1] extracted features based on
the linkage patterns of web sites and trained a decision tree and a Bayesian classifier to classify
each site to one of the 8 predefined functional categories. A cosine metric based clustering of
the feature space produced a decent amount clusters whose members appeared to belong to the
same spam ring. As it was not the original goal of their research, no results were published on
classifying sites as spam or non-spam.
Finally we remark that identifying spam pages is somewhat analogous to classifying web
documents into multiple topics. Several results [103, and the references therein] demonstrate
that classification accuracy can be significantly increased by taking into account the class labels
assigned to neighboring nodes. In accordance with our experiments, Qi and Davison [103]
found that most of the improvement comes from the neighborhood defined by co-citation.
62 CHAPTER 5. LINK-BASED SIMILARITY
5.2 The similarity based spam detection algorithms
In our experiments we use the four similarity measures co-citation (Section 2.9.1), SimRank
[71] (Section 2.9.2), Companion [45] and singular vectors (Section 2.10) and we suggest the
applicability of further SimRank variants. In this section we briefly introduce notation and
the efficient algorithms [56, 111] that we use. We give special importance to algorithms with
modest hardware requirements; our experiments ran on a commodity PC.
Similarity based spam prediction is less straightforward than trust and distrust propagation
that directly ranks a page as honest or spam. Before describing the algorithms we hence describe
our evaluation method. For a given unknown host u, our algorithm computes the similarity top
list of u and makes a prediction based on the known spam and honest hosts in this list. For each
similarity measure we extract four different features from the size k similarity top list of u. Let
the top list contain h honest and s spam pages of the evaluation sample; in general h + s < k.
Let the sum of the similarities of these pages be s∗ and h∗, respectively. We define our features
as follows.
• Spam Ratio (SR): fraction of the number of spam within labeled spam and honest pages,
s/(s + h).
• Spam over Non-spam (SON): number of spam divided by number of honest pages in the
top list, s/h.
• Spam Value Ratio (SVR): sum of the similarity values of spam pages divided by the
total similarity value of labeled spam and honest pages under the appropriate similarity
function, s∗/(s∗ + h∗).
• Spam Value over Non-spam Value (SVONV): similarity value sum for spam divided by
same for honest, s∗/h∗.
Given the above values, we may impose a threshold and predict the unknown input page spam
if the measure is above the prescribed threshold. For different thresholds we obtain predictions
of different quality; by decreasing its value we increase recall and likely but not necessarily
decrease precision. For threshold 0 we predict all pages as spam with recall 1 and precision
equal to the spam fraction in the data.
We use Singular Value Decomposition (Section 2.10) for nearest neighbor search after a low
dimensional projection of the adjacency matrix of the host graph. We represent host u by row
u of VtΣt and measure similarity as the Eucledian distance in this t dimensional space. Besides
computational advantages, the low dimensional projection also serves noise reduction in a sim-
ilar way as Latent Semantic Indexing [100] applies to the word–document matrix. We perform
brute force nearest neighbor search in the t dimensional space defined by Ut and consider the
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first 1000 nearest vertices as top list. Given that we use very low values of t, we could replace
brute force search by more elaborate data structures [110] or approximation [70]; in our case
however the sample was small enough to use the simplest implementation. In the experiments
we use the SVDPACK [19] Lanczos implementation for computing the first 10 singular vectors.
HITS [76] authority scores are the coordinates of the first (right) singular vector of the
adjacency matrix of the vicinity subgraph. The idea of using more than just the first singular
vector appears in several results. The instability of a single authority (or hub) vector and stability
of the t dimensional projection Ut is described by [94].
The Companion algorithm [45] builds the 2-step alternating neighborhood of the given ver-
tex; then performs the HITS authority computation and returns the top authorities. We use a
simplified version that excludes steps such as edge weighting, large degree handling and link or-
der considerations. For a query node v we build the vicinity graph by selecting nodes of length
two alternating forward-backward of backward-forward paths starting at v. We randomly trun-
cate large neighborhoods to a maximum of 2000 nodes in the first step and to 10 in the second
step, as in [45]. We rank by the authority score and use all nodes of the vicinity graph as the top
list. HITS is computed by simple power iteration.
5.3 Experiments
5.3.1 Data sets
We use two data sets, the 31.2 M page crawl of the .de domain described in Section 3.4.1 and
the 20 M page crawl mostly from the Switzerland domain described in Section 3.4.2.
Unlike in our previous result on the .de data (Section 4) we use the host graph not just
because it speeds up experimentation but also because intra-site links that would give trivial
similarity within the same host disappear and host level detection forms a more interesting task.
When forming the host graph, we are left with a modest 808 K node and 24 M edge graph.
Figure 5.1 shows1 the distribution of categories among the hosts that slightly differ from the
page level distribution in Section 3.4.1. Our prior findings of 16.5% spam among .de pages
agrees with [96] and our increased 20.9% spam on the host level with the similar findings of
[11] for the .uk domain.
Note that the Swiss evaluation sample contains 3.6% spam only.
5.3.2 Evaluation by cross-validation
We evaluate our methods together with trust and distrust propagation baselines by three-fold
cross-validation. We observe very large variance between various random cross-validation
1Unless stated otherwise all figures in this section refer to the .de dataset.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of categories among the hosts in the evaluation sample
splits, a phenomenon that we show for a single feature instance in Fig. 5.2 but holds for all
features. The explanation likely lies in the small size of our sample: given a query page, the
success of spam classification heavily depends on whether those possibly very few pages that
contain relevant information are used for test or training.
Given the large variance, we show or measurements by averaging cross-validation results
with five independent random splits that altogether correspond to 15 measurements, three for
each split. Since in the 15 measurements we will have precision values for different values
of recall and we may have several precision values for a given recall, we need special care to
average our measurement.
We average our measurements by extrapolating precision for a given recall from measured
values. For a single measurement we obtain precision–recall value pairs by imposing different
thresholds. By decreasing the threshold we increase recall; increment is however in discrete
steps that changes whenever the threshold reaches new hosts. If we reach a single host that is
spam, both precision and recall increases by certain amount; we may then linearly extrapolate
between the recall at the boundaries. If the new host is honest, we obtain a new, smaller pre-
cision value for the previous recall; we average all these values for a single experiment before
averaging between measurements. Given ties, we classify more than a single host that makes
recall increase and precision change according to the fraction α of spam among the new hosts.
For a given intermediate recall we may then interpolate by adding a (possible fractional) num-
ber of pages with a fraction α of spam and computing precision. This method reduces to linear
interpolation for a single new spam page with α = 1 but nonlinear otherwise.
5.3.3 Baseline results
For baseline experiments we use the trust and distrust propagation measures of Wu et al. [127]
by personalizing host based PageRank on known honest vs. spam hosts. We reproduce results
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of these experiments as Wu et al. [127] choose methods other than precision-recall curves for
evaluation. We use the following variants described by [127]. In a single personalized PageRank
iteration we may use constant splitting or logarithm splitting instead of equal splitting. We
also use the maximum share variant by replacing summation by maximum in the PageRank
equation. We leave the maximum parent variant of [127] for future work; we hence test 6
variants, including the original BadRank corresponding to simple summation equal splitting in
the terminology of [127].
We experiment with different values of teleportation probability c. This value has negligible
effect on the best measures as seen in Fig. 5.3. Other measures depend more heavily on c
and reach best performance in general with low c. Since it has no effect on the comparison of
methods we use a uniform c = 0.1 afterwards.
Our best trust and distrust propagation measurements are shown in Fig. 5.4, all with c = 0.1.
Unmodified BadRank (equal split, summation) performs best at lowest recall but outperformed
by equal split maximum share later. Logarithm split maximum share performs slightly worse
but still outperforms the remaining three variants. Due to insufficient trust information, trust
propagation performs very poor and often even below the random 20.9%, meaning that most
spam manages through in cheating our TrustRank. Only the best original TrustRank (equal
split, summation) is shown.
As suggested in [127], we improve results by combining trust and distrust propagation. We
use linear combinations; surprisingly the best results are achieved by subtracting 0.8 times the
trust score from 0.2 times the distrust score. Results for using the previous three best distrust
score and the single best TrustRank is shown in Fig. 5.5. Hence although TrustRank performs
bad alone due to insufficient trust information in our .de data, still its vote gives significant
help to distrust propagation.
Over the search.ch dataset unmodified BadRank and logarithm split with simple sum-
mation performed best, their graphs are shown in Fig. 5.11.
5.3.4 Similarity based features
We use features with abbreviations SR, SON, SVR and SVONV as described in Section 5.2.
For all four Figs. 5.6–5.9 we see bad precision at low recall, suggesting that honest pages may
also collect high ranked similar spam that may be the result of artificial rank manipulations that
is left for future work to verify.
Our methods perform best at relative high recall; finally converges to the random choice of
20.9% spam among hosts for very high recall. We see SR–SVR and SON–SVONV values in
pairs performing very close. The first pair performs better at medium recall; the second pair
performs poor in general but has a peak at higher recall where outperforms the first pair.
Co-citation (Fig. 5.6) turns out best even at relative high recall values with Companion














Figure 5.2: The outcome of five threefold cross-validation results with various random splits, for
co-citation with SVR, altogether corresponding to measurement points over 15 precision-recall
curves.
(Fig. 5.7) as the runner up. Our observations on the relative ordering of individual features and
similarity functions hold unchanged over the Swiss dataset as well, hence we report figures only
for the German data.
While our most successful candidate, notice the very easy spammability of the co-citation
measure. As described by [80] we have to resist both false negative attacks of hiding spam as
well as false positive ones that demote the competitor. Co-citation suffers the same vulnerability
against spammers as in-degree: a spammer can easily create a large number of honey pot hosts
that co-cite quality pages along with the spam target. By adding hosts that point to an honest h
and a spam host s, we increase the chance of voting h spam and s honest.
Although SimRank (Fig. 5.8) performs poorest, it is the most robust measure against ma-
nipulations. In order to modify SimRank, the spammer must use a large number of pages that
lead to both the spam target s and an honest page h. Depending on the PageRank of h it is very
unlikely that paths backward from h meet those from s that would mean high SimRank between
h and s. Replacing SimRank with a better performing variant remains future work.
5.3.5 Comparison of best features
Finally in Fig. 5.10 we show all features that perform best for certain ranges of recall. BadRank
is very effective at penalizing spam only but its recall is very low. Combined 0.2 times distrust
minus 0.8 times trust propagation extends BadRank’s performance, for the price of slightly
decreased precision, to somewhat higher recall. Finally co-citation seems most effective for
prediction with high recall. We also show Companion in Fig. 5.10 as the next best candidate if


















Figure 5.3: Precision as a function of recall for distrust propagation with logarithm splitting and






















Figure 5.4: Precision as a function of recall for the best three distrust propagation variants and
the single best TrustRank trust propagation.
Turning to the Swiss dataset depicted in Fig. 5.11 we observe that distrust propagation with
the unmodified BadRank algorithm or logarithm split and simple summation performs on par
with Companion. As before, co-citation is the most precise measure with the exact feature
depending on the level of recall. However overall accuracy is significantly higher than those
observed for the .de domain. We attribute this to the (undisclosed) method(s) applied by
search.ch [105] to assemble the blacklist. For example, as already noted in Section 5.3.1, a
large number of link farms share the same IP address. Hence a simple similarity measure based
on the equality of IP addresses associated with the domains also works reasonably well. As
shown on Fig. 5.12 accuracy decreases if we keep only a single domain for each IP address in






















We presented hyperlink similarity based single feature classification measurements over a man-
ually classified sample of the .de domain and the search.ch datasets. Our experiments
demonstrated that similarity search based methods are indeed capable of learning the difference
between spam and non-spam pages.
In Chapter 6 we combine the similarity search with machine learning algorithms that uses









































Figure 5.7: Precision as a function of recall for the four companion features.

















































































Figure 5.11: Precision as a function of recall for the best features on the Swiss domain graph.



















Figure 5.12: Precision as a function of recall for the best features on the Swiss domain unique
IP addresses.
Chapter 6
Graph stacking: a machine learning
technique for label propagation
In this section compare graph-based semi-supervised learning techniques both for Web spam
filtering and for telephone user churn classification.
Semi-supervised learning, a new field of machine learning surveyed e.g. in [130] also ex-
ploits information from unlabeled data for learning. We focus on the applicability of classifying
Web spam and telephone churn, i.e. users who cancel their telephone line. Our assumption is
that the label (spam and churned, respectively) of a node in a graph is similar to those of its
neighbors.
We compare various means of stacked graphical learning, a meta-learning scheme in which
a base learner is augmented by expanding the features of one node with predictions on other
related nodes in a graph is introduced by Kou and Cohen [77]. The methodology is used with
success for Web spam detection in [30]: they use the average label of the neighbors as a new
feature for the classifier.
We run our tests on the Web Spam Challenge datasets. The baseline decision tree utilized all
graph based features related to a node (i.e. features related to the “home page” or the “maximum
PageRank node within site” are not computed) [30] and a Naive Bayes classifier of the machine
learning toolkit Weka [123] over the content based features of the Web Spam Challenge Phases
I and II data. Depending on the data set the best forms of graph stacking improve the F-measure
by 1-10% as shown in Section 6.3.2.
In addition to spam we also tested the graph labeling methods on a telephone call graph, a
data type that appears less in the publications of the data mining community. Closely related to
our work are the churn prediction results by machine learning methods on real data [3, 122, etc.];
these results however do not exploit neighborhood information embedded in the call graph.
The telephone call graph is formed from the call detail record, a log of all calls within a time
period including caller and callee id, duration, cost and time stamp. The vertex set consists of
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all nodes that appear at least once as caller or callee; over this set calls form directed edges from
caller to callee.
Churn classification uses customer information (price package, time since in service etc.) as
well as traffic aggregates in various call zones and directions. We use one year call detail record
and all customer information up to a given time; the classification target consists of users who
leave service in the fourth month “in future” (in a time period with no information available for
the classifier). Due to the sparsity of positive instances (below 1% churn in a month) and a large
amount of churn explained by external reasons such as the customer moves churn classification
is a hard task; baseline reaches F = 0.08 and this is improved to 0.1 by stacked graphical
learning. In the industrial practice the goodness of the churn classification is measured by the
recall of the top list of 10% of the customers, i.e. they are willing to involve a maximum of 10%
of their customers in direct marketing campaigns and want to maximize the potential churn
reached. In this sense our baseline classification has a recall of 40.8%, improved to 47% by
stacked graphical learning.
In this section we concentrate on spreading trust (or no churn) and distrust (churn) informa-
tion from known nodes with the help of hyperlink based similarity measures. Our main goal
is to identify features based on similarities to known honest and spam pages that can be used
to classify unknown pages. We propose a set of spam and churn classification methods that
combine graph based similarity to labeled nodes (Section 5) with trust and distrust propagation
both backward and forward. For example given a link farm alliance [63] with one known target
labeled as spam, similarity based features will automatically label other targets as spam as well.
Our stacked graphical learning algorithms generate features by averaging known and pre-
dicted labels for similar nodes of the graph by the measures in Section 6.2.1. We compare
various similarity measures, including simple and multi-step neighborhood, co-citation, cosine
and Jaccard similarity of the neighborhood as well as their multi-step variants [56] described in
detail in Section 6.2. For the purposes of evaluation we consider these algorithms separately,
by performing one classification experiment for each feature.
Bibliographical notes
This chapter’s results appeared in [41] and represent a joint work with András Benczúr, Dávid
Siklósi and László Lukács. My main contribution is the definition and implementation of the
stacked features and graph similarity measures.
6.1 Related results
Trust and distrust propagation are in fact forms of semi-supervised learning surveyed by Zhu
[130], a methodology to exploit unlabeled instances in supervised classification. Stacked graph-
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ical learning introduced by Kou and Cohen [77] is a simple implementation that outperforms
the computationally expensive variants [30, 77].
Identifying spam pages is somewhat analogous to classifying web documents into multiple
topics. Several results [103, and the references therein] demonstrate that classification accuracy
can be significantly increased by taking into account the class labels assigned to neighboring
nodes. In accordance with [14] (Chapter 5), Qi and Davison [103] found that most of the
improvement comes from the neighborhood defined by co-citation.
Several link-based algorithms were designed to evaluate node-to-node similarities in net-
works that can be used to give alternate, similarity based weights to node pairs. We refer to
[85] for an exhaustive list of the available methods ranging from co-citation to more complex
measures such as max-flow/min-cut-based similarities of [90] in the vicinity graph of the query.
Co-citation is in fact used in [60] as an elementary step of trust propagation. Another method
[91] penalizes the biconnected component of a spam page in a subgraph obtained by backward
distrust propagation.
Finally we mention the first example that gives anecdotal evidence for the usability of sim-
ilarities in hyperlink structure to identify spam. Amitay et al. [1] extracted features based on
the linkage patterns of web sites and trained a decision tree and a Bayesian classifier to classify
each site to one of the 8 predefined functional categories. A cosine metric based clustering of
the feature space produced a decent amount clusters whose members appeared to belong to the
same spam ring. As it was not the original goal of their research, no results were published on
classifying sites as spam or non-spam.
6.2 The stacked graphical learning framework
6.2.1 Feature generation
For a given unknown node u and edge weight function w (that may be in or out-degree, co-
citation, PageRank etc.), our algorithm selects the k largest weight neighbors of u to generate a
new feature based on the known spam and honest hosts in this set. As in Section 5 we extract
four different features from this set of size k or possibly less if u has less than k neighbors.
Each element v is either classified as spam with weight p(v) or else labeled spam or non-spam;
in these cases we let p(v) be 0 and 1, respectively. Let s and h be the sum of p(v) and 1− p(v)
in the set; remember s + h < k is possible. We define a weighted version s∗ and h∗ as the sum
of w(uv) · p(v) and w(uv) · (1− p(v)).
We use the same features as Section 5.2:
• Spam Ratio (SR): fraction of the number of spam within labeled spam and honest pages,
s/(s + h).
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• Spam over Non-spam (SON): number of spam divided by number of honest pages in the
top list, s/h.
• Spam Value Ratio (SVR): sum of the similarity values of spam pages divided by the
total similarity value of labeled spam and honest pages under the appropriate similarity
function, s∗/(s∗ + h∗).
• Spam Value over Non-spam Value (SVONV): similarity value sum for spam divided by
same for honest, s∗/h∗.
In most of the experiments we use SVR that also performed best in Section 5 ; a small compar-
ison is made in Section 6.3.2.
We add the new feature defined by either of the above to the existing ones and repeat the
classification process with the extended feature set. Since the features are unstable if the neigh-
borhood N(u) is small, we also define versions SR’, SON’, SVR’, SVONV’ by regressing
towards the undecided 1/2 or 1 value:
SR′ = 1/2 + (SR− 1/2) · (1− 1/
√
|N(u)|); SON′ = 1 + (SON− 1) · (1− 1/
√
|N(u)|).
6.2.2 Direction of propagation
We may use both the input directed graph, its transpose by changing the direction of each edge,
or the undirected version arising as the union of the previous two graphs. We will refer to
the three variants as directed, reversed and undirected versions. For an edge weight function
d : V × V → R we use d−(u, v) = d(v, u) for the reversed and d± = d + d− for the undirected
version. We extend this notion for an arbitrary similarity measure sim(u, v) computed over edge
weights d and compute sim−(u, v) over d− and sim±(u, v) over d±.
Performance of directed, reversed or undirected varies problem by problem: the templatic
nature of a Web spam farm is best characterized by similarity of out-links (directed), honest
pages have incoming links from honest ones (reversed) and finally similarity in a telephone call
graph is best characterized by the undirected graph since communication is typically bidirec-
tional regardless of the actual caller–callee direction.
6.2.3 Multi-step propagation
There are several variants of weighting neighbors at distance k. We may consider reachability
and exact reachability as dk(u, v)reach = 1 if v is reachable from u by a walk over k edges, 0
otherwise, respectively dkexact(u, v) = 1 if v is reachable from u in exactly k steps and over no
shorter paths, 0 otherwise. We may take the number and the weighted number of such walks:
dknum(u, v) is the number of walks over k edges that reach from u to v and dkwnum(u, v) is the
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probability of reaching v when starting at u and at each step choosing a random neighbor with
probability proportional to the outgoing edge weights. The main multi-step feature we use is







p(v) · dkwnum(u, v).
6.2.4 Co-citation, Jaccard and cosine
We use the similarity measures described in Section 2.9.
By the notation of Section 6.2.2 coc−(u, v) denotes directed co-citation and coc±(u, v) is the
undirected co-citation. We may also use co-citation downweighted by degree, coc(u, v)/d(u) ·
d(v).
Similarly Jac−(u, v), Jac±(u, v) and cos−(u, v), cos±(u, v) denote the directed and undi-
rected versions of Jaccard and cosine coefficients.
Since filling a quadratic size matrix is infeasible, we calculate Jaccard and cosine only for
existing edges. The resulting scheme downweights unimportant edges but is unable to add
“uncaught contacts” to the network. It is possible to find all pairs with weight above a given
threshold by fingerprinting techniques; we leave performance tests for future work.
6.3 Experiments
6.3.1 Data sets
For Web spam classification we used the WEBSPAM-UK-2006 dataset described in Section 3.4.3
and we followed the same methodology as Castillo et al. [30].
We use the Web Spam Challenge Phase I dataset WEBSPAM-UK-2006 [32] that consists of
71% of the hosts classified as normal, 25% as spam and the remainder 4% as undecided as well
as the Phase II data set WEBSPAM-LIP6-2006. In this experiment we consider three tasks. First
we use Phase I data (the Domain Or Two Humans classification that introduces additional non-
spam domains and gives 10% spam among the 5622 labeled sites) with the publicly available
features of [30] and then classify by the cost sensitive C4.5 implementation of the machine
learning toolkit Weka [123] with bagging. Then we use the Phase II data set features and use
the Naive Bayes classifier of Weka. Finally we compute all graph based features of [30] for the
Phase II data graph and classify by C4.5 again. We combined the text and graph classifiers by
SVM.
For churn classification we use data from a small Hungarian landline telephone service
provider. We form features based on aggregated call cost duration in different cost segments,
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F-measure graph stacking
×1000 none d coc coc− coc±
iterations 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
Web Spam I 689 695 707 709 669 677 722 724
Web Spam II
small, text
592 589 601 605 598 599 599 601
Web Spam II
small, link
762 752 788 793 774 765 748 738
Web Spam II
large, link
939 962 983 984 987 988 983 984




161 155 141 142 197 200 114 121
F-measure graph stacking
×1000 Jac Jac− Jac± cosine PPR
iterations 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Web Spam I 715 703 689 690 679 680 698 699 715 719
Web Spam II
small, text
590 590 592 594 593 595 600 601 599 600
Web Spam II
small, link
756 762 782 777 766 756 760 760 731 737
Web Spam II
large, link
984 985 975 976 961 953 982 982 958 960




254 265 153 147 175 158 267 280 277 257
Table 6.1: 1000 times the F-measure shown for different data sets and edge weights.
including daytime and off-peak, weekday and weekend as well as local and different long-
distance call volumes. Part of the users perform calls via an alternate provider by dialing a
prefix; these calls are aggregated similarly for each user. We also use the pricing package
information that also includes a distinction of company and family lines as well as the start
date of the service usage. For a time range of 12 months, after aggregating calls between the
same pairs of callers we obtained a graph with n = 66, 000 nodes and m = 1, 360, 000 directed
edges.
We use the cost sensitive C4.5 implementation of the machine learning toolkit Weka [123]
with bagging. Since the running times on the full data set were over 10 hours we also compiled a
smaller data set where a random sample of non-churned users were dropped, resulting in 7, 151
users but we kept the entire graph.
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d coc coc± Jac Jac± cosine PPR
SON’ 602 615 602 600 599 599 599
SON 600 614 602 599 599 599 598
SR’ 603 618 609 611 606 610 608
SR 601 619 611 610 605 610 603
SVONV’ 602 607 602 598 596 597 599
SVONV 600 606 602 598 596 598 599
SVR’ 603 618 609 603 606 604 600
















Table 6.2: Top: 1000 times the F-measure shown for different data weights and feature gener-
ation methods. Bottom: the effect of the top list size for SVR.
6.3.2 Classification results
Table 6.1 shows the first three digits of the F-measure for the best selected settings, with the best
result in bold. For the Web spam data we measure over the testing labels while for churn we use
10-fold cross-validation. Since the text and link SVM-combined Web Spam II experiment is
computationally very expensive, we only computed the base and the simple neighbor methods
that give 0.738 and improve to 0.748 for the small and 0.338 vs. 0.449 for the large graph.
In Table 6.2 we can see that the difference between the feature generation methods of Sec-
tion 6.2.1 are minor and the length of the top list has little effect in the range of k between
100 and 1000, although for co-citation the very long and for others the very short lists deteri-
orate the performance. Results are shown for the text features of the small Phase II graph and
single-iteration stacked graphical classification.
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6.4 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented Web spam and landline telephone churn classification measurements over the
Web Spam Challenge Phase II and a small Hungarian landline telephone provider year 2005
datasets. Our experiments demonstrated that stacked graphical learning in combination with
graph node similarity methods improve classification accuracy in both cases. Due to the large
number of possible feature generation methods the results are by no means complete but show
a very good performance of co-citation and little actual use of the neighborhood beyond two
steps in the graph.
For future work we plan testing more complex multi-step variants of co-citation and the
Jaccard coefficient. Jeh and Widom [71] define SimRank as a multi-step generalization of
downweighted co-citation. In an alternate formulation [111] the k-step SimRank Sim(k)v1,v2 equals
the total weight of pairs of walks with length k′ ≤ k that both end at u and one of them
comes from v1 while the other one from v2. The weight of the pair of walks is the expected
(1 − c) meeting distance as defined in [71]; notice we get downweighted co-citation if k = 1.
Computing the full SimRank matrix requires quadratic space; we may use the algorithm of
[111] instead. Finally Fogaras and Rácz [56] described XJaccard as the weighted sum of Jaccard
coefficients of the distance k neighborhoods and gave an efficient randomized approximation
algorithm to compute it.
Chapter 7
Language model disagreement along
hyperlinks
In this chapter we concentrate on identifying hyperlinks between topically dissimilar pages. Our
key result is the feasibility of the language model disagreement technique [92] for spam filtering
in the scale of the entire Web, both in terms of algorithmic efficiency and quality. Mishne et al.
[92] demonstrate that the distribution of words (a unigram language model) is a strong feature
for telling legitimate and spam blog comments apart. We analyze inter-document relationship
over the entire corpus by solving anchor text model comparison and prediction aggregation. We
have similar goals as Davison [44] who trains a decision tree to distinguish navigational and
link-spam links from the good ones. We target at penalizing links that are, in Davison’s [44]
terminology, nepotistic and “are present for reasons other than merit.”
Links between topically unrelated pages may not necessarily be malicious; however they
draw undeserved attention to the target. As examples, links to owners, maintainers, employee
personal pages typically have no spamming intent but may have an effect of artificially ranking
the target high. The widely investigated comment spam in blogs and guest books [92] form the
malicious examples. Gyöngyi et al. [64] give more examples such as mirroring with the sole
purpose of linkage to spam targets.
Our method fights a combination of link, content and anchor text spam. We catch link spam
by penalizing certain hyperlinks and compute modified PageRank values as in [4, 13, 49, 65].
At the same time we also identify content spam if it has no trusted source of backlinks from
the same topic. Finally we directly penalize false anchor hits that give very high value in Web
IR systems, although measurements of this effect are beyond the scope of this report. We also
remark the possibility to combine our method with link farm [13, 49] and navigational link [44]
detection that detect different aspects of spamming and nepotism.
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Bibliographical notes
This chapter’s results appeared in [16] and represent a joint work with András Benczúr and
István Bíró. My contribution to the results is the evaluation and the solutions for the large scale
implementation.
7.1 Algorithm
We present an algorithm that identifies hyperlinks where the language model of the target and
the source disagree. We then feed suspicious edges into a weighted PageRank calculation [4] to
obtain NRank, the “nepotism rank” of the page that we suggest be subtracted from the original
PageRank values.
As in [92], our key ingredient is the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL) between the unigram
language model of the target and source pages. In fact it is infeasible to compute KL for all
pairs of documents connected by hyperlinks. Two computationally easier tasks are to compare
each anchor text to (i) the document containing it (as in [92]) and to (ii) the document pointed
by it. While the former task is simply performed by a linear scan, the latter task requires an
external memory sorting of all anchor text found.
We set aside the hyperlink if the corresponding language models differ. Since we assume
that a typical anchor spam is generated by the owner of the page, we consider case (ii) above,
complementary to the malicious anchors of reputable pages in [92]. We observe best perfor-
mance when we extend the anchor text by a few neighboring words to properly handle very
short anchor such as "here"; we obey segment boundaries defined by HTML and punctuation.









where C is the text of the entire corpus and w is a word. We build a language model similar
for an anchor A. In our experiments we set λ = 0.8; we smooth anchor term frequencies









a formula asymmetric in A and D. The current form weights words by their relevance within
anchors; we observed degradation in performance when computing penalties by exchanging the
role of A and D in (7.2).
As suggested in [92] the distribution of (7.2) is a mixture of Gaussians. KL will have nor-
mal distribution over the documents if all anchor text behave the same since we sum random
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of KL between anchor text and target document with our spam and
reputable sample shown.
variables that correspond to words and the words themselves have sufficient independence to
yield a normally distributed sum. If however we have fair and malicious hyperlinks, the two
categories will be biased towards the smaller and the larger values, respectively. While obser-
vations fit very well for case (i) anchor text and containing documents, for case (ii) anchor text
and pointed documents behave more complex with spam taking lead around KL ≈ 4 to 5 with
a clear separating component with mean around 10, as seen in Fig. 7.1. The figure is based on
the manually classified sample used in [13] (Section 4).
In our algorithm we form the set of suspicious hyperlinks with KL value (7.2) above a
threshold. We obtain NRank by feeding suspicious edges into PageRank by keeping edge above
7. Results are useful in the range 4-7; increased values of the threshold give NRank results
farther from original PageRank and improve recall.
7.2 Experiments
As in Section 4 and Section 5, we used the 31.2 M page crawl of the .de domain described in
Section 3.4.1 and we followed the same methodology described in Section 4.4.
The sample consists of 1000 pages and selected by first ordering the pages according to their
PageRank value and assigning them to 20 consecutive buckets such that each bucket contained
5% of the total PageRank sum with bucket 1 containing the page with the highest PageRank.
From each bucket 50 URLs are chosen uniformly at random, resulting in a 1000 page sample
heavily biased toward pages with high PageRank which we manually classified into reputable
and spam categories. For the details of the manual classification and the PageRank computation
see Section 3.4.1 and Section 4.4.
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Figure 7.2: Fraction of spam in NRank buckets (top) and average demotion of reputable and
spam pages into NRank buckets as a function of their PageRank bucket (bottom).
We measure the efficiency of our method by assigning each page to one of the 20 NRank
buckets, the ith NRank bucket having exactly the same number of pages in it as the ith PageRank
bucket. In Figure 7.2, top, we see that the top NRank buckets contain a very large amount
of spam. And in Figure 7.2, bottom, we show how NRank distinguishes between spam and
reputable pages by plotting the average difference between the PageRank and the NRank bucket
number separately in each PageRank bucket. On the average we observe reputable pages have
significantly larger demotion in NRank compared to PageRank than spam pages. We show
pages of the thema-.de click, a link farm with no useful content separate, as these pages
use a simplistic but coherent e-commerce language. At low PageRanks legitimate pages are
penalized slightly more than spam ones; notice however the real useful NRank penalties are
never based on the bottom buckets. Also note that manual spam classification is particularly
noisy at low qualities and the sample may also be less representative here.
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7.3 Conclusion
Our experiments show the applicability of language model disagreement along hyperlinks to
differentiating among spam and non-spam pages. A few questions left to subsequent work are
as follows. Explore the effects of models and parameters (e.g. use n-gram models, smooth-
ing, different penalty functions) and assess variants of the algorithm (e.g. by personalization).
Measure the effect of NRank and anchor text downweighting on precision for popular or finan-
cially lucrative queries. Lastly evaluate the combination of content and link based spam filtering
schemes.
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Chapter 8
Commercial intent classification for spam
detection
In this chapter we propose a number of features for Web spam filtering based on the occurrence
of keywords that are either of high advertisement value or highly spammed. Our features include
popular words from search engine query logs together with their misspellings as well as high
cost or volume words according to Google AdWords. We also demonstrate the spam filtering
power of the Online Commercial Intention (OCI) value assigned to an URL in a Microsoft
adCenter Labs Demonstration and the Yahoo! Mindset classification of Web pages as either
commercial or non-commercial as well as metrics based on the occurrence of Google ads on
the page. We run our tests on the WEBSPAM-UK2006 dataset compiled by Castillo et al. as a
standard means of measuring the performance of Web spam detection algorithms. Our features
improve the classification accuracy of the publicly available WEBSPAM-UK2006 features by
3%.
As noticed by Gyöngyi and Garcia-Molina [62], most spammers just want financial gain
from their activities. In contrast to previous content-based spam features such as distribution,
entropy, compressibility (Section 3.3.1) targeting the templatic nature of machine generated
pages, our features hence try to capture the semantics of spam content. By utilizing external
classifiers we also enrich the available training and test data.
We investigate the following features for Web spam detection:
• Online Commercial Intention (OCI) value assigned to an URL in a Microsoft adCenter Labs
Demonstration (Section 8.2.1).
• The Yahoo! Mindset classification of Web pages as either commercial or non-commercial
(Section 8.2.2).
• Google AdWords advertisement keyword suggestions for the sites as well as keyword scores
(Section 8.2.3).
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• The distribution of Google AdSense ads over pages of a site (Section 8.2.4).
• A measure for queries based on spammer success in obtaining high rank for the particular
query, measured on our own search engine (Section 8.2.5).
We run our tests on the WEBSPAM-UK2006 dataset compiled by Castillo et al. [32] as a
standard means of measuring the performance of Web spam detection algorithms. The baseline
decision tree of [30] utilizing content based features achieves an F-measure of 0.610 over our
dataset. Inclusion of our new features improves the performance by 3% to an F-measure of
0.641. Similarly, our features boost the F-measure of the content+link based classifier from
0.687 to 0.716 and the stacked graphical learning scheme results from 0.693 to 0.738 as shown
in Section 8.3.
Bibliographical notes
This chapter’s results appeared in [15] and represent a joint work with András Benczúr István
Bíró and Tamás Sarlós. The methods described here achieved the highest F-measure in the Web
Spam Challenge competition in 2007 [121]. My contribution to the results is the evaluation
part, feature combination, search engine success and Google AdWords features.
8.1 Related results
Ntoulas et al. [96] introduce a number of content based spam features including number of
words in page, title, anchor as well as the fraction of page drawn from popular words and the
fraction of most popular words that appear in the page. Castillo et al. [30] extend the latter
idea by measuring the popularity (frequency) of words in an in-house query log instead of the
documents themselves.
Query popularity and monetizability were also used to improve cloaking and redirection
spam detection. Chellapilla and Chickering [36] aid their cloaking detection method by using
the most frequent words from the MSN query log and highest revenue generating words from
the MSN advertisement log. As a different method, Wang et al. collect spammer targeted key-
words [120] by extracting the most frequent anchor words from spammed forums; they use
these keywords for redirection based spam detection.












Figure 8.1: Distribution of the logarithm of OCI commercial-informational score among labeled
sites.
8.2 Attributes and classification results
8.2.1 Microsoft OCI
Extending Broder’s well-known taxonomy of web search [26] the Microsoft adCenter Labs
Demonstration available at
http://adlab.msn.com/OCI/oci.aspx determines the Online Commercial Intention
(OCI) of a URL. OCI is described by the probabilities of the URL being commercial-informational,
commercial-transactional or non-commercial. The probabilities sum up to 1 and are derived by
an SVM based classifier utilizing both the textual content and the HTML tags of the web pages
[42]. We have successfully gathered the above mentioned OCI probabilities for the home page
of 4995 sites, and failed to do so for the remaining 627 sites, mostly because they were dead
when collecting the data in February 2007. Fig. 8.1 depicts the distribution of the logarithm of
commercial-informational scores obtained and shows that spam pages tend to be more commer-
cially oriented.
8.2.2 Yahoo! Mindset
Yahoo! Mindset (http://mindset.research.yahoo.com) classifies Web pages as ei-
ther commercial or non-commercial. It estimates the commercial nature of a Web page by a
value ranging from +2 (most commercial) to−2 (most informational).Pages scored 0 are a bal-
ance of commercial and informational. These scores are assigned by a linear SVM based text
classifier developed and trained by Y! Research.
We assigned a score to each site in our training and evaluation sample by issuing an ’inurl:’
query to Mindset and then extracted the score corresponding to the site’s home page in the















Figure 8.2: Distribution of Yahoo! Mindset commercial intent score among labeled sites.
returned search engine results.
We have managed to assign a Mindset score to 3170 hosts, the rest were either missing from
the current Yahoo! Search index or Mindset failed to classify them. In accordance with Fig. 8.1,
Fig. 8.2 demonstrates that normal pages are less likely to be commercial in nature as measured
by Mindset.
8.2.3 Google AdWords
AdWords is Google’s flagship pay-per-click advertising product (http://adwords.google.com).
Advertisers bid on keywords and their ads are displayed as sponsored links alongside the or-
ganic search results. The AdWords Keyword Tool
(https://adwords.google.com/select/KeywordToolExternal), that is also avail-
able as the API call getKeywordsFromSite(), recommends keywords for a site in the form of a
tuple (group, volume, competition, phrase). Volume shows the relative amount of users search-
ing for that keyword on Google on a scale 1–5 and advertiser competition shows the relative
amount of advertisers bidding on that keyword on the same scale. In addition, for a query word
or phrase, we can obtain the following information: estimated average cost per click CPC; the
estimated ad positions, the average position in which the ad may show, expressed in ranges
between an upper and lower value. Based on these estimates we define the page cost of a docu-
ment by summing up the CPC value of each (known) word occurrence in it and then we average
the page costs over each host. The top and middle part of Fig. 8.3 depicts the distribution of the
most discriminative AdWords features.
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8.2.4 Google AdSense
Given a site with h pages in the test set, we count the number of pages p ≤ h that contain Google
AdSense contextual advertisements (http://www.google.com/adsense) as well as the
total number of Google ads a over the site; this latter may be more than h. Then we assign three
features to each host: a, a/p (average number of Google ads over pages containing Google ads)
and p/h (fraction of pages containing at least one ad).
8.2.5 Spammer search engine success
We define a feature for most popular or competitive queries that describes the extent spammers
manage to inject their pages into query top lists. In contrast to the 10% spam among labeled
pages, we see 13% spam among the top 1000 hits of our search engine for popular queries
taken from a commercial search engine log. When using highly competitive Google queries,
this value increases up to 20%, showing the success of spammers in obtaining high rank in a
baseline search engine without spam filtering.
Given the AdWords scores to queries (see Section 8.2.3) we also obtain features by measur-
ing how well a page fits to the query. Since an excessive study of the possible text based ranking
features is beyond the scope of our work , we simply computed the top 1000 hits for each query
using the aforementioned ranking scheme of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Search En-
gine [12]. For sites that appeared on the top list we computed penalties that we eventually
summed up for all competition 5 queries, hence penalizing sites that appear high for several
such queries. We have several choices to incorporate the position i of a page in the hit list for
a query; we obtained the best features by giving score 1/i2 for the page. Our feature is finally
formed by adding up the 1/i2 values of a page for all competition 5 keywords.
Anchor text is perhaps the single most important factor in relevance ranking [51] and hence
forms key target for spammers. Amount of anchor text can be used to classify spam [96].
Hence we restricted the location of keyword occurrences to anchors only and rerun the scoring
procedure. In Fig. 8.3, bottom, we graph the distribution of anchors words with advertiser
competition value 5 that refer to a given site.
We also define the spam-popularityweight over queries as follows. For each q of the 10,000
most frequent queries we compute the top 1,000 hits for each query. We give the fraction of
spam within labeled1 (spam / (spam + nonspam)) as weight for q and then compute a weighted
penalty sum for each host similarly to the method of competitive queries.
1For less than 25 labeled hits, we replaced the number of non-spam simply by 25 in order not to overscore due
to the large variation.



































Figure 8.3: Distribution of Google AdWords based features across labeled spam and nonspam
sites. Top: average advertiser competition of the site. Middle: total estimated upper ad position
of the site. Bottom: Logarithm of the advertiser competition value 5 term occurrences in anchors
to site.
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Feature set Section CoverageC. imp. C.+L. imp.
OCI 8.2.1 89% 0.8% 0%
Mindset 8.2.2 58.6% 0.9% 1.3%
AdWords 8.2.3 92.5% 1.4% 0.4%
Page cost 8.2.3 100% 1.1% 0.3%
AdSense 8.2.4 100% 2.0% 0.5%
Comp. queries 8.2.5 100% 0.7% 0.4%
C. q. in anchor 8.2.5 100% 0.4% 0.3%
Spam popular. 8.2.5 100% 2.2% 1%
All 8.2 52.4% 3.1% 2.9%
Table 8.1: Comparison of improvements by feature.
8.3 Experimental results
We used the WEBSPAM-UK2006 dataset described in Section 3.4.3 and we followed the same
methodology as Castillo et al. [30].
We merge our features with the publicly available ones of [30] and then classify by the C4.5
implementation of the machine learning toolkit Weka [123].
In addition to the above classification framework of [30] we also evaluate spam filtering
by measuring the amount of spam in top hits for queries over the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences Search Engine [12]. The search engine uses a tf.idf based ranking combined with 25%
HostRank scores [49] and increased weights for query words within URL, anchor text, title and
additional HTML elements. The engine itself lacks spam filtering since it is designed primarily
for the .hu domain that, in our observation, is virtually spam free.
We evaluate our results by adding the new features to the content based and the content+link
based feature sets provided by [32]. We train and test the Weka implementation of the C4.5
decision tree with the same settings as in [30]. We measure accuracy by the F-measure of the
spam detection task. Since we could not compute all features for all hosts, we compare our
results to the baseline computed on the set of 2292 hosts that have all features we would like to
evaluate.
Inclusion of all our new features to the content based features increases the performance
of the decision tree by 3% from an F-measure of 0.610 to 0.641. Similarly, our features raise
the F-measure of the content+link based classifier from 0.687 to 0.716, which corresponds to
67.1% precision at 76.7% recall. These improvements are statistically significant at a p-value
of 19% and 15%, respectively.
Castillo et al. [30] utilize the stacked graphical learning method to incorporate the neighbor-
hood of a node in the classification process. According to preliminary experiments, by including
our new features we improve the F-measure in this case by over 4% from 0.693 to 0.738.
In Table 8.1 we analyze the contribution of each feature. We define coverage as the number


















Figure 8.4: Effect of selected features on accuracy.
of sites for which the given feature is available divided 4365, the number of sites for which
the content based features of [30] are available. Except for Mindset, all features cover a large
fraction of the labeled samples. The fourth and fifth columns list the F-measure improvements
achieved by augmenting the content and content+link based features of [30] with a given set
of new features. The strongest individual features are Mindset, AdSense, and spam popularity;
however neither of them comes close to the combination of all commercial features. The sum
the of the OCI commercial estimates is moderately correlated with the Mindset scores, ρ = 0.54,
which partially explains the weaker individual performance of the former.
Lastly, we depict the precision-recalls curves of the augmented classifiers in Figure 8.4.
Inclusion of most of our features improves precision at lower levels of recall compared to the
content+link based classifier of [30]; we plot ’competitive queries’ as an example. In contrast,
Mindset performs best at high recall and hence the precision curve of the combination of all
features stays above the baseline generally.
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we demonstrated the spam filtering power of measuring the commercial intent of
a Web page, thus also supporting the observation that most of the Web spammer activities are
targeted for financial gains [62].
By using both search engine implementations (the MSN Search OCI and Yahoo! Mindset)
of commercial intent analysis as well as query popularity and monetizability based features we
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were able to improve the spam classification accuracy of the feature set described by [30].
As future work we intend to repeat our classification measurements reported in Section 8.3
utilizing the stacked graphical learning method of [30]. We also plan to extend our monetizabil-
ity analysis by checking for advertisement and affiliate program links and redirections in the
sense of [120].
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Web spam filtering methods are similar to e-mail spam in many aspects. Large and wide training
data is needed that contains both positive and negative instances. This requires enormous human
effort from the search engine operation.
Spam filtering is performed on the server side, so the spammers can only test their methods
in a slow, indirect way. While the email spammers can test their methods quickly and directly
on their own local spam filter, it takes time for a newly created web spam to appear in a search
engine and it is difficult to identify what criteria were used for spam filtering.
Link structure plays important role in web spamming and web spam fighting. Google Page-
Rank, the all-time-favorite target of spammers was based on the assumption that the good qual-
ity pages can be selected by the mutual reinforcement of the links between good pages but today
it is also vulnerable to spam. Newer methods are based on the assumption that trusted pages
point to other trusted pages and rarely link to spam pages. Spam pages tend to be grouped
together in order to reinforce each other and spam pages usually linked by other spam pages.
Spam classification can exploit this behavior. Computing features from the neighboring pages
or iterative propagation of features along hyperlinks can improve classification accuracy.
New types of spam become widespread with the explosion of social media. Blog comment
spam [92] consists of adding comments such as “nice page” and a URL pointing to a link farm
Since a search engine may not want to blacklist the entire blog, the target URL may receive
trusted inlinks in the search engine’s ranking. Similar forms of spam appear in bookmarking
systems [78]. With a slightly different purpose, video comment spam appears in YouTube [17]
consisting of commercials or unrelated low-quality posts added as comment to a large number
of popular posts.
As the most recent development in Spam filtering research, a number of results appeared
that consider temporal features in Web spam filtering [43, 50, 73, 87, 114].
The efficiency of web spam filtering seems to be satisfactory, the results on the first pages of
leading search engines are rarely spam. Over the past few years the research of this field caught
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up with the more traditional e-mail spam filtering area. Moreover, according to recognized
researchers of the area, spammers show lack of creativity in inventing new ways to trick search
engine algorithms, leading to a near win of the researchers on web spam filtering.
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